

HUMANITIES INSTITUTE

19TH CENTURY WORLD HISTORY

First Industrial Age in World History, 1750-1914

Course Description

This course provides an overview of 20th Century World History from a historical perspective, which includes the broad contexts of technological, social, political, economic, and psychological change and disruption in the 20th century. In this course, political, cultural, economic and social changes are explored.

About the Professor

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P.N.S.

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I. Introduction: The Shape of the Period

Most world historians identify a distinct period of time, often called the long 19th century, between the middle of the 18th century and the advent of World War I and the wave of initial 20th-century revolutions. The framework for this 160-year span was set primarily by the advent of industrialization, first in Britain and then in other parts of the West, and the fact that, for many decades, Western countries retained an essential monopoly over this powerful new economic system. The result was a series of rapid changes, as Western society itself adjusted to the huge disruptions of industrialization but also used the industrial system to build its military and economic power in relation to virtually every other world region. The notorious spate of imperialist expansion, particularly to Africa, southeast Asia and Pacific Oceania, was one clear result. Only at the very end of the period, with the early industrialization of Russia and Japan, did it become clear that the Western monopoly on industrialization would ultimately end.

Industrialization, Western power and imperialism are not of course the only themes of this world history period. The long 19th century was also a period of labor emancipations. Gradually, with major differences in timing depending on region, two classic traditional systems of labor – slavery and serfdom – largely ended, at least in terms of formal legal structures. The result did not eliminate labor exploitation – industrialization itself arguably introduced important new forms – but it certainly changed the context in law, initially in the Atlantic world but ultimately more widely. On a second front: New, more clearly modern forms of globalization also emerged, particularly from about 1850 onward, thanks to dramatic inventions in transportation – steamships and then transcontinental railroads – but also the formation of new organizational structures that set new global rules in matters such as postal delivery, patents, and quarantines against contagious diseases. Emancipations and globalization obviously linked to Western industrialization and its worldwide impact, but they deserve separate exploration.

Somewhat ironically, though in part as a defense against imperialism and new forms of global contact, the long 19th century also saw the birth and spread of nationalism as a new means of defining identity and, in many cases, of organizing the state. Initially a Western invention, by 1900 intense nationalism had spread to places like India and, within the Ottoman Empire, Turkey.

Though not on a global scale, important regional developments also mark the period. In Western Europe and the Americas, the first decades of the period saw what some have called the age of Atlantic revolution. Major independence movements occurred in the Americas, sometimes (as in the United States and Haiti) mixed with revolution, and in Europe the great French revolution of 1789 was followed by outbursts in 1830 and 1848. China experienced its own massive social unrest in the largely destructive Taiping rebellion of the middle decades of the period, while Japan reversed a long policy of isolation with the Meiji reform era from 1868 onward. Key regional developments of this sort must be worked into the account of the period, along with the more obviously global themes.

The long 19th century was not marked by any overarching cultural themes, except to the extent that most regions of the world now had to develop some reaction to growing Western influence. In the West itself, the growing rise of science was probably the most important single development, with major discoveries such as evolution and genetics, in biology, and with growing application of scientific research to technology and agriculture. This was a missionary period as well, with new Christian energy in various parts of the world and important Islamic activity in sub-Saharan Africa.

The period also saw an interesting oscillation between war and peace. The era of revolution brought massive warfare in Europe, around the armies of the French revolution and Napoleon, with spillovers into European empires in other parts of the world. After 1815, however, the emphasis shifted to peace, at least in the relations among the world's great powers; but imperialist expansion brought regional wars in many places beneath this umbrella. More explicit attention to peace emerged toward the end of the period, though quite obviously it proved inadequate to prevent renewed global conflict in 1914.

Framework

This course will explore the world's first industrial age mainly through thematic headings. This first section defines the period more fully, indicating some of the analytical challenges involved – including the fact that the period does not have a tidy beginning. It also explores major regional categories, obviously looking at the new importance of the West (and its geographic expansion) but also several other regional clusters that need attention lest the world seem to homogenize under the new spur of Western power and influence.

Economic change must be clearly identified, for it was the motive force for the period as a whole. This involves exploring the industrial revolution but also its global ramifications in regions – most of the world – that did not

directly industrialize. This was a period, for example, when the human ability to affect the environment expanded greatly, not only in the smoky, polluted factory cities of the West but also in rubber plantations or cotton fields that expanded to new, sometimes unsuitable regions to feed industrial appetites.

Political change must embrace the implications of industrialization and imperialism for the state, but also the forces of revolution in several world regions. European imperialism challenged political structures everywhere, leading to various efforts at reform and reaction even where the new empires did not establish direct control. The new force of nationalism added a further dimension to the political equation.

Social change varied of course, between the industrial West and other parts of the world. Labor emancipations, as noted, had ultimately global impact. Gender changes, though concentrated in the West, would begin to spill over to other regions by the final decades of the period, leading to complex new debates. The rise of factory industry and urbanization, again focused particularly on the West, also created new institutions like the department store that were ultimately exported more widely.

Biological developments were much less fundamental in this period than in the periods both before and after. There was however significant population growth, which in turn, along with emancipations, stimulated new patterns of migration. The West ultimately introduced a new demographic pattern that would ultimately – though only later – have global impact.

Cultural developments reflected new patterns of contact, though again without producing clear global themes. Western science began to have wider impact; new regional exchanges stimulated interesting innovations in the arts. Religion remained an important force, with the new missionary outreach an important manifestation.

Finally, changes in warfare – generated in part by industrial technologies—vied with new interests in peace and the development of novel global institutions. The long 19th century ended, most obviously, when the forces of war surged forward once more, overwhelming widespread hopes that human progress would finally include the ability to resolve conflicts in less violent fashion.

Basic treatments (pick at least one)

The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. By C.A. Bayly (Wiley-Blackwell, 2003).
Pages 1-82.

The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century. By Jürgen Osterhammel (Princeton University Press, 2014).
Pages 1-107.

The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. By Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton University Press, 2001).
Pages 3-28.

Section I: Discussion Questions

What were the main factors that began to change the West's relationship with the other major regions of the world in the second half of the 18th century?

Using evidence from Africa, Latin America and the land empires of Asia, discuss the advantages and disadvantages of colonial vs. no colonial status by the second half of the 19th century.

What are the main issues in defining the boundaries of the West in the last half of the 19th century?

What were the main factors that caused differences in relationships to the West for the principal regions of Asia during the long 19th century?

Chapter 1: Main Issues and Problems

The Problem of Inception. The advent of the long 19th century was not marked by a clear set of events, which complicates establishing a clear beginning date. The period's main theme – Western industrialization and its implications for the world – emerged only gradually. Britain began industrializing clearly by the 1770s and 1780s – this was when the first steam engines were applied to manufacturing – but even in Britain older economic forms long overshadowed the rapidly-growing factories. By the early 19th century British manufactured exports began throwing tens of thousands of traditional hand workers out of their jobs in India and Latin America, but even then the global implications of the new economy were slow to take shape. China's manufacturing advantages, for example, clearly crumbled only in the 1830s, when European power, plus the new import from British India – opium – began to eat away at the Chinese traditional advantage in balance of payments. The period, in other words, had a long gestation, and major characteristics – including the bulk of the new burst of imperialism, and also the new patterns of globalization – developed more clearly after 1850 than before.

The Mid-18th Century. Some ancillary developments, however, help justify attention to the mid-18th century. Western economic gains, though pre-industrial, began to create new competitive opportunities. For example, by this point many Western manufacturers had learned how to use new printing presses to create colorful cotton cloth, long an Indian monopoly; their gains, plus new tariffs on Indian goods, helped shift economic advantage to Western Europe. The collapse of the Mughal Empire in India gave Europeans – primarily the British East India Company – new opportunities to take control over large sections of the subcontinent, often in alliance with local princes; Indian history shifted decisively as it gradually became a major British colony. The Seven Years' War – 1756-63 – fought on the seas, in Europe, in North America, and in India, gave Britain a decisive imperial edge over France, and it would retain this global primacy until the later 19th century. The later 18th century also saw the more extensive European exploration of Australia and Pacific Oceania – mainly again under British leadership – and this began to pull this region more fully into the mainstream of world history.

The Challenge of Revolutions. Major revolutions, first in the United States and then France, established important new historical themes somewhat apart from industrialization. Both revolutions heralded republican governments, though France would revert to monarchy later on for a time; both set up parliaments and issued defenses of a series of human rights. Both had some democratic leanings, though full democracies (even for adult, white males) would emerge only a bit later. Both promoted nationalism. The revolutions had clear impact throughout the Atlantic world (except for Atlantic Africa), even in regions, like Germany, that were not fully redefined. Russia was affected, though tsarist conservatism kept it apart from full contagion. Except for the growing global popularity of nationalism, revolutionary principles did not have much initial impact in Asia or Africa, where it was European imperialism, not liberal politics, that constituted the clearest force for change. Figuring out how to relate the burst of revolutions to fully global history is another complication of the long 19th century.

The West and the Rest. Dealing with regional balance is another clear challenge for this relatively short period. The West became more powerful: there is no question here, as new military and economic advantages combined with outright imperialism. Even places, like Latin America, that became politically independent were clearly under Western economic thrall. But there is a danger in this situation to view the West as the only major actor in the period, with every other region simply struggling to react. In fact, local conditions and initiatives interacted with Western intervention; there was no single pattern. A few societies, headed by Japan, actually managed to limit Western influence through an aggressive pattern of reforms. In other cases, even where independence was less complete, regional values produced important variations and debates. The spread of nationalism – though in one sense a common pattern – expressed opportunities for different regions to define their own identity even within a new cultural and political idiom. Establishing regional differences, both continuing and new, and resultant opportunities for comparison is a key analytical task for the period.

Sub-periods. The long 19th century is short enough that internal sub-periods do not pose a huge analytical challenge. We have noted that the fairly gradual, if inexorable, emergence of Western industrialization calls attention to the later decades of the period, when the basic themes become more clearly marked. There were few new Western imperial gains in the first half of the 1800s for example, compared to the explosion after 1850. In the West itself, the “age of revolution” clearly ended with the outbursts of 1848; major revolutions would return to the world stage only after 1900, and then almost entirely outside the West. The later 19th century was also complicated – compared to its earlier decades – by the emergence of a united, industrializing Germany and also the United States

as rivals to Britain and a receding France. These competitors heightened economic and military competition and would ultimately help lead to World War I.

Ending the Period. World War I, 1914-18, provides a vivid marker at the end of the long 19th century, introducing or accelerating a host of changes including the gradual reduction of West European power in favor of the United States, Japan, and intensifying nationalisms in places like India. But the importance of the War was joined by the early stages of Japanese and Russian industrializations, significant in themselves and a clear sign that the West's industrial monopoly would be short-lived. It was amplified also by revolutions in Mexico (1910) and China (1911), the latter particularly suggesting that major political and social changes could overturn centuries-old structures; a Russian rising in 1905 foreshadowed the revolutionary surge in this country in 1917. There's little doubt that a world history period was ending by this point, but defining the major factors amid a series of significant developments will require further discussion.

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Discussion

What major economic and political shifts intensified around the beginning of the long 19th century?

What are some of the problems with current periodization of the 19th century? What changes support earlier and later periodization dates for the long 19th century?

How and why did the global role of the West change during the long 19th century? What are the risks of undue emphasis on the West, and what are some analytical safeguards?

Chapter 2: World Regions: The West

Basic Themes. Quite obviously, this was a major period in Western history. Spurred by the 18th century Enlightenment and rapid social change, the age of revolution introduced durable new themes and institutions into Western history. French revolutionary conquests spread some revolutionary gains to other parts of the region, attacking the legal privileges of the aristocracy, promoting the importance of parliaments and constitutions, undercutting the remnants of serfdom in the countryside and artisanal guilds in the cities. The results were not evenly spread; Germany, for example, remained a more conservative political unit than France or Britain (where a series of reforms later extended the vote). Everywhere after 1850, however, parliaments became more important and liberal, and even radical political movements contended with conservative political parties. Everywhere also, after 1860 or so, socialist parties joined the mix. The West also urbanized and industrialized rapidly, after the British lead, which created massive social change. Education spread widely. Birth rates began to decline, and then between 1880 and 1920 the West would undergo what is called the demographic transition, as falling birth rates combined with rapidly-falling infant death rates to produce a new population structure. Cultural changes included the continued gains in science and, sparked particularly by the theory of evolution, a new debate between religion and science that tended to reduce the cultural role of religion in many parts of the West.

Geography. Defining where the West was is an important issue for the period. The West's heartland, of course, remained in France, Britain, the Low Countries – this is where the major political changes took clearest shape. But Germany's new importance, as a source of economic and cultural change, was capped by German unification during the years 1864-1871, which along with Italian unification altered the shape of the European continent and produced new nationalist rivalries. But the "West" was not fully confined to the European heartland. Many Western ideas and political forms, including nationalism, penetrated the Balkans and helped produce successful independence movements from the Ottoman Empire; east-central Europe generally featured a combination of distinctive economic forms, with ideas and examples from the West. Russia was also affected by Western ideas and even institutions like the department store, though the preservations of the tsarist regime and the aristocracy marked the nation off from full embrace of Western patterns. More important, in defining the West, was the growing importance of the "settler societies" – the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – where European majorities interacted with shrinking native populations. These societies had some distinctive features, thanks to frontier conditions and other factors – the United States, for example, remained far more religious than much of Europe, thanks probably to the importance of religious identities for masses of immigrants; but they also shared and even led in many Western patterns. Debating the precise location of the West in this period of growing world influence is not a simple task.

Victorian and Modern. The long 19th century in the West also featured an interesting set of tensions between developments we would clearly recognize as "modern" and some distinctive characteristics that simply inhered in the period itself. The idea of a new Victorian culture – though obviously highlighting Britain – captures some of the tension. In gender issues, for example, many Western countries placed new emphasis on the importance of women and their special moral qualities, even seeing them as civilizing influences over men. This was not a traditional view. Key reforms included new opportunities for education, a clearly "modern" development, plus the reduction of the birth rate. But Victorian leaders (aside from the growing feminist movement) did not see men and women as equals and resisted full political equality. They urged respectable women to be wary of sexuality, urging a rather prudish family life. In art, similarly, while new movements particularly after 1850 heralded modern forms, against customary representations for example in painting, Victorian taste itself long preferred more traditional landscape and portraiture, creating clear tension between artistic leaders and the cultural establishment. Pinpointing the balance between changes that began in this period and would continue later, in shaping a "modern" Western society, and patterns that were distinctive to the period itself forms an important analytical challenge.

West and the Rest. Westerners generally felt unprecedented superiority over the rest of the world during the long 19th century. Appreciation of the achievements of other societies, which had marked the 16th and even 17th centuries to some degree, gave way to a widespread belief that the West alone deserved the label, civilized. The Western press poured increasing scorn on places like the Ottoman Empire – now labeled the "sick man" of Europe. Increasingly, outright racism picked up the Western sense of superiority: the "white" race was seen as possessing distinctive political and business skills that other regions lacked. The movement of social Darwinism, interpreting the ideas of evolution and survival of the fittest to suggest that Western peoples might be biologically superior to other races,

gave a veneer of science to these notions. Against racism, however, Western culture was also marked by a growing sense of humanitarianism, a fellow feeling for distant peoples amid injustice. It was this humanitarian sentiment that fueled the growing Western movement against slavery, and would later lend sympathy to other causes – for example, the plight of minority nationalities in the Ottoman Empire – that caught Western fancy. Racism and humanitarianism could mix. Western reformers might attack slavery but show little interest in the plight of ex-slaves. The two approaches also mixed in imperialism: here was a movement that directly expressed the Western sense of superiority, but could also lead to interests in reforming “native” conditions – as in attacking slavery within Africa, or seeking to apply Western gender standards to the colonies. The idea of the “white man’s burden”, at the end of the 19th century, summed up the mixture of hope and condescension. What was not yet clear, in dominant Western eyes, was whether “natives” might be able to develop civilized forms, under imperialist tutelage, or would forever need Western leadership. Needless to say, these Western attitudes had significant impact in other parts of the world.

Industrial Society. The most important single theme within the West during the long 19th century was the articulation of the world’s first industrial society. The rise of a new, industrial middle class and the even more rapid development of an urban working class were two important results. New forms of consumerism – including the department store – would herald new levels of industrial production, though the gains were very unevenly distributed. Artists debated what to do in reaction to industrialization: should they paint soothing scenes as a contrast with industrial turmoil, or should they develop new forms to capture the turmoil itself? And of course political leaders struggled to keep pace with industrialization: what new government functions were essential both to keep industrialization going and to combat some of its ills? What voting systems would best protect political stability amid rapid social change? Western responses to industrialization became increasingly clear after 1850. They did not provide the only possible model of an industrial society, but they certainly organized the first examples. Along with sheer global power, this aspect of Western history of the period commands attention.

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Discussion

How and why did many Europeans turn to racial factors to explain their position in the world?

What were the distinctive features of Western society in the long 19th century?

How were the settler societies linked to patterns in Western Europe? Were they part of the same civilization?

How did the rise of nationalism affect the West in the long 19th century? Did it greatly complicate the coherence of this region in world history?

What is the significance of the Crystal Palace and similar expositions in characterizing the West in 19th century world history?

What accounts for the rise of socialism in the West in the 19th century? Did the various forms of socialism reflect or contradict other features of Western civilization?

Chapter 3: Latin America

Background and Rationale. Latin America had come under Spanish and Portuguese colonial control well before the 18th century. Several other nations had smaller holdings, particularly in the Caribbean. The Latin American role in the world economy was well established, with silver and sugar from the colonies playing a major part in the expansion of world trade. Latin American society also began to forge a distinctive blend between European cultural forms, particularly Catholicism, and local beliefs and rituals. These relationships did not entirely change in the long 19th century. But the new period saw significant shifts in Latin America, as the region, along with the United States, became the world's first "postcolonial" region. The region was not a major diplomatic or military actor in world affairs, still under the shadow of European power but with increasing United States influence as well. But its economic activities broadened in some respects, and internal political and cultural changes established important patterns for the future. Because it has not been a clear trouble spot, or the origin of one of the world's major cultural traditions, Latin America sometimes gets short shrift in world historical accounts. But interactions in the long 19th century deserve attention.

Independence. Spain and Portugal introduced new colonial controls in the later 18th century (as Britain tried to do to some extent in the United States). The result limited local political voice in favor of European officials. Locally-born Europeans, the criollos, resented this deprivation of power. Closely attuned to developments in Europe and the United States, and the late-18th-century revolutions, the criollos took advantage of Spain's distraction during the Napoleonic wars to lead a series of independence struggles, mainly between 1810 and 1820. Leaders like Simón Bolívar were interested in setting up liberal as well as nationalist regimes, with parliaments based on the votes of the properties classes. These were not social revolutions; the lower classes were not significantly involved, though a few new regimes, as in Mexico, did abolish slavery. Only in Haiti, in 1796, was there a real revolution, as local leaders challenged French power and slavery alike, creating a new but very unstable regime in their stead. Most Latin American countries had established independence by the 1820s, though the relationship between Brazil and Portugal was somewhat complex for a time.

New Nations. Many newly independent nations had difficulty maintaining political stability. They often faced economic problems, as the removal of Spanish control opened the door to massive British imports. Disagreements over boundaries led to the collapse of several ambitious combinations – the United States of Central America or Gran Colombia – into smaller nations. Lacking leadership experience in the colonial regime, many of the new nations also fell under dictatorships, at least periodically. Finally, contests between political liberals and conservatives representing the Church, the landlords, and the military led to frequent changes of regime. Challenges of this sort are sometimes seen as characteristic of many new nations, and would show up again in decolonizations elsewhere during the 20th century.

Economics. Economic fortunes varied by region in Latin America, and fluctuated over time. Some countries, like Argentina, developed profitable exports in beef and other agricultural products, particularly after the development of refrigerated shipping in the 1870s. Many regions began exporting minerals, like Chilean copper, while Brazil added rubber plantations – along with increased resulting soil erosion – as well as coffee to its export list. Colombia and Venezuela developed coffee plantations. No Latin American country was yet able to make a full turn to industrialization. Most depended instead on increasing exports of foods and raw materials, whose prices often declined amid growing competition. New rail systems and ports, designed to facilitate these exports, often led to extensive debts to Western banks. Living standards often declined, with low wage labor frequently replacing earlier slavery or plantation serfdom.

Culture. Latin American links to European high culture remained strong, and not only because of the Catholic Church. European architecture defined the expansion of urban centers like Buenos Aires, in Argentina. Latin American novelists kept careful track of developments in Europe and to some extent the United States. Yet there were also efforts, as with the Uruguayan author Enrique Rodo, to argue for special virtues in Latin American culture as against pervasive Western materialism. At the same time, various artists and writers also adopted regional themes, like the role of native Americans or the blend of European, American and (from imported slaves) African elements. Tensions sometimes developed between a Europeanized upper class and both native American and mixed (mestizo) populations; the upper class frequently sought to impose reforms on the rest of society, for example in trying to regulate sexuality, in the interests of respectability as they defined it.

Social Change. The abolition of slavery was a major development, though it occurred gradually in the region as a whole. Brazilian abolitionists, copying arguments from their Western counterparts, finally brought about abolition in

this society in the 1880s, and Cuba followed suit a decade later. In some countries, slave labor was increasingly replaced by new levels of immigration, particularly from southern Europe (including Italy) and also parts of Asia on the Pacific coast. Use of indentured contracts, often for 7-years duration, brought workers from India into parts of the Caribbean. These developments, plus the expansion of export agriculture and the dependence on low wages, led to frequent social protest and conflict, though there were no full revolutions until the outburst in Mexico in 1910. On another front, some organized feminism appeared in Latin American cities, and women intellectuals were active for example in the field of poetry. A number of countries, particularly during periods of liberal rule as under Benito Juarez in Mexico, in the 1850s and again the later 1860s, expanded school systems; literacy gained ground in several regions.

World Position. Latin America in the long 19th century clearly combined a number of key Western features—not only in high culture, but in political liberalism – with a distinctive economy and cultural combinations and diversities. This is another case where defining and comparing civilization boundaries, and characteristics, prompts legitimate debate. The region remained subordinate to the Western economy, despite political independence. French and British and then later Americans frequently pressured local policies by sending fleets or troops to intervene. The United States intervened even more decisively by carving out a new country, Panama, from Colombia in order to serve its interests in building the Panama Canal early in the 20th century; and United States victory over Spain, in 1898, led to direct U.S. colonial control over Puerto Rico and substantial influence in Cuba. At the same time, partly because of these outside forces, Latin America itself remained surprisingly free from conventional wars. Military forces were mostly small, and concentrated on internal politics rather than systematic aggression. The result, again, was a distinctive combination.

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Discussion

What impact did Western imperialism have on Latin America? In what ways was Latin America able to resist or limit Western influence?

How did independence impact different parts of Latin America? What groups benefitted, and what groups suffered as a result of independence?

To what extent do developments in Latin America demonstrate the differences between wars for independence and revolutions?

How were Indians incorporated into Latin American nations?

How were patriotism and nationalism conceptualized following the independence movements?

What were the main political groupings in Latin America from independence to the early 20th century? How do they compare with political groupings in the West in the same decades?

Chapter 4. The Colonial World

Established colonies. Europeans had already established colonial controls over a few port cities in Africa, over some coastal regions in India, and over much of present-day Indonesia before 1750. The wave of attacks on colonialism in the Americas had no immediate impact on these holdings. Britain did respond to American agitation, and to tensions between French and British settlers in Canada, by granting increasing political autonomy in this case, from 1839 onward. The result was the gradual establishment of a federal system, with an independent national parliament, even as Canadian settlement pressed westward during the 19th century. European settlement of Australia began in 1788, and here too increasing political autonomy was granted during the 19th century, leading to national independence in 1900.

India. The gradual British takeover of India was a huge development in world history. As the British government increasingly assumed control from the East India Company, the result was the most integrated political system India had experienced since the classical period, ultimately extending over most of the subcontinent. The British did not seek to reform Indian society entirely: thus the caste system was left substantially untouched. Christian missionary efforts had limited results, though Hindus and Muslim were wary. On the other hand the British did try to abolish the killing of widows as part of Indian patriarchal customs, and they were joined by some Indian reformers; they also gradually expanded educational opportunity, though not to the rural masses. Economic change was more substantial, particularly after 1850, as the British sponsored a national railway system; and some Indian industrialization resulted, along with the production of colonial goods for export. A major rising, the Sepoy rebellion of 1857, was ultimately put down, and the British responded by allowing Indians a greater role in the civil service and in local governments. A nationalist movement, the Congress movement, emerged in the 1880s, pressing for greater Indian control over the economy and a larger voice in government.

Southeast Asia. From India, the British established controls over Burma, Thailand and Malaysia during the 19th century, though without entirely removing local government including the Thai monarchy. The French began a long conquest of Vietnam and adjacent territory. Economic changes included the expansion of rubber plantations and other activities designed to supply European industry. In Vietnam (Indochina) extensive Christian conversions occurred, and the Latin alphabet gradually supplanted earlier writing systems for the Vietnamese language.

The Middle East/North Africa. While the Ottoman Empire retained technical independence, as did the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, the British established colonies along the coast of the Persian, or Arab gulf. Russians and British vied for influence in Persia, without fully claiming control; and British efforts to conquer Afghanistan simply failed, one of the few such cases in this imperialist era. North Africa, in contrast, was fully taken over. The French moved on Algeria as early as 1829, though gains were slow. Italians and French later acquired the rest of the region, save for British control in Egypt.

Africa. Here was the site of the big imperialist scramble, particularly after 1860, as French, British, German and Belgian forces carved out separate empires (along with some small Spanish holdings, and earlier Portuguese territories in Angola and Mozambique). An Italian effort to conquer Ethiopia failed, in 1896, and Liberia, as a home for some American ex-slaves, was technically independent; otherwise the whole sub-Saharan subcontinent was divided up. Small European forces, armed with repeating rifles and early machine guns, could mow down masses of local troops. Colonial policies varied: the French sought to train an elite in French culture, while Britain placed greater emphasis on primary education. Belgians exploited native labor in essentially slave-like conditions, with much physical coercion. German policy varied, harsh in southwest Africa, where a local rebellion triggered an early effort at genocide, but more constructive in east Africa. Overall, pressures to gain increasing revenues from Africa, through expanding export industries based on cheap labor, intensified from the late 19th century onward. Substantial European settlement developed in parts of the south and east, running estates and mines. Considerable immigration from India also contributed to the urban labor force and merchant activity.

Colonial Holdings Compared. The huge scope of European colonial empires, even after decolonization in the Americas, was a fundamental feature of the long 19th century. But conditions varied widely, depending on age of colonial arrangements and, probably, different degrees of racism. Economic exploitation was part of the process everywhere, but its hand lay heavier on much of Africa than in the more diverse economy of India. European interference in local social and cultural arrangements varied as well. There was often some attempt to change gender arrangements: in Africa, this could lead to European attempts to increase the legal position of husbands and fathers, for the informal family power of African women seemed inappropriate. But other practices – for example, the tradition of female circumcision in northeastern Africa – were left alone, lest local resistance be needlessly

stimulated. Degrees of missionary activity varied, and major inroads on established religions, like Islam in southeast Asia, did not usually occur. Nationalism sprang up in many colonial settings, though it remained somewhat tentative until after World War I.

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Discussion

What are the main debates on the “scramble” for Africa?

What are the legacies of this colonization? How did colonial powers interact within Africa?

What influences led to increased Indian nationalism? What were British responses?

What were the problems with French colonization in Algeria? In what ways was it different from European colonies elsewhere?

How did colonization impact local and imperial identities?

What were the main differences and similarities between Africa and India as colonies during the long 19th century?

Chapter 5: The Land Empires of Asia and Eastern Europe

Background. The early modern period had seen the emergence of several large, land-based empires, often the result of conquests, in many parts of Europe and Asia. In modern terms (though not the original terms of the time), most of these empires were multinational. During the long 19th century as we have seen a few of these empires simply collapsed, as with the Mughals in India. But Russia, China, and the Ottoman Empire persisted, though with increasing interference from the West. Austria-Hungary, under the Habsburgs, was another key empire in east-central Europe. And, though not an empire, the case of Japan deserves attention as well. The basic questions for these huge regions were: how much could Western interference be countered or reversed, and through what kinds of measures? And, particularly in cases where reforms were largely unsuccessful, was it better to remain technically independent, amid growing outside exploitation, than it was to be a colony in this period?

Russia. Russia, part of the European diplomatic orbit to some extent, tried to reduce Western influence during the revolutionary period. It played a key role in coalitions that ultimately defeated Napoleon, and it then supported European conservatism against radical contagion, even sending troops to help defeat the Hungarian revolution of 1848. It continued to press for expansion, however, which led to recurrent, usually successful wars with the Ottoman Empire. One such conflict, promising new territorial gains, prompted British and French resistance in the Crimean War of 1854-5, which Russia lost though not without bitter struggle. This defeat, plus the arrival of a new tsar and the influence of more Westernizing reformers, prompted the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, which ended this labor system though requiring peasant payments to the aristocracy in compensation. Other reforms in local government and legal systems followed, until an anarchist attack on the tsar prompted a return to conservatism after 1881. Nevertheless strong efforts at economic development continued, including the gradual construction of the trans-Siberian railway, and Russia began to emerge as an industrial power, if a tentative one, by 1900. The effort to combine economic change with political conservatism prompted massive unrest, including the rise of a Marxist movement, and then defeat in a war with Japan led to a revolution in 1905. Reforms were quickly withdrawn, and the government soon headed into World War I, hoping for foreign policy gains that would compensate for social tensions. Russia also suffered from the rise of nationalist movements that sought expressions for regions like Poland or Ukraine.

China. The long 19th century was a disaster for China. The Qing emperor famously rejected a British request for more open markets in the 1790s, noting that China needed nothing from the outside world. But by 1839, amid growing government incompetence, British-led forces defeated the Chinese in the first Opium War, beginning to force markets open. Growing Western imports soon combined by direct seizures of coastal territories in long-term leases, by all the European power including Russia. Japanese pressure was added in through the Sino-Japanese war in the 1890s, which would soon lead to Japanese takeover of Korea and new demands on Chinese territory itself. The massive internal rising, the Taiping rebellion, which killed millions of people in the mid-19th century, along with conservative resistance to change and the weak government, seriously limited Chinese response. Only at the end of the period did growing numbers of Chinese students abroad and a growing interest in reform suggest the possibility of more constructive change. The 1911 revolution, overturning the imperial system, was the next step in what would be a long corrective process.

The Ottoman Empire. Early in the 19th century a new ruler in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, tried to launch a modernization process, in what was technically part of the Ottoman Empire. The ruler sent students abroad, encouraged cotton growing, tried to set up new industry; but he was blocked by Western opposition and his own interest in military expansion against the Ottoman regime. The move ended in substantial failure. For the Ottoman Empire more generally, the rise of nationalism in the Balkans led to progressive risings and the formation of new nations, beginning with Greece and Serbia. Western and Russian economic and military pressure created additional complications. The regime attempted to respond by improving government efficiencies, creating protections for all religions, and reforming penal codes in the Tanzimat reform movement, which began in 1839. An 1876 constitution even provided for a parliament. These measures did not, however, eliminate internal unrest, and reforms were largely abandoned in the final decades of the period – aside from efforts to collaborate with Germany to improve the

military. In the final decades of the 19th century, new nationalist interests, among Arabs but also in the reform-minded Young Turk movement, established additional challenges.

Japan. Japan, long substantially isolated under a feudal monarchy, the Tokugawa shogunate, was forced to acknowledge Western insistence for more open markets with the arrival of foreign fleets, beginning in 1853. After near-civil war, the shogunate was dislodged and the Meiji reform era, named for a new “enlightened” emperor, began in 1868. In short order, though under Western constraints in areas such as tariff policy, the Japanese launched a new educational system, promoted public health, modernized the military, and replaced feudalism with a new, mixed elite and a parliamentary political system. Industrialization was well underway by the 1880s. Japanese modernization combined careful study of Western systems with a desire to promote Japanese values such as community solidarity and obedience to the emperor, newly bolstered with support from conservative nationalists. Success in wars with China and Russia led to new imperialist goals, including acquisition of islands such as Okinawa and then the occupation of Korea.

Comparisons. Many older, land-based empires faced new challenges in this period. New nationalist claims led to unrest. Western intervention reduced economic and military autonomy. Responses varied, and explaining the differences constitutes a clear challenge to comparative analysis, blending current factors with older features. Everywhere, reforms were difficult. Everywhere, there emerged some recognition that some change was essential – if only in military systems – but an equally insistent desire not simply to become Western. The result was a range of strengths and weaknesses that factored strongly into larger global patterns, particularly after 1850.

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Discussion

How did Russia relate to the West during the long 19th century? What were its most “Western” characteristics?

What were the causes and main results of the 1905 revolution?

What are the main issues in assessing changes and continuities in the Ottoman Empire during the long 19th century?

What were the principal causes and results of the Opium War?

What defined national identity in Qing China? How did this impact modern Chinese identity?

What was the impetus for the Meiji reforms? What were the main results?

What factors differentiated Japan from China and the Ottoman Empire by the second half of the 19th century?

Section II: Economic Change

Fundamental economic transformations in many ways defined this period in world history, the long 19th century, more clearly than any other force. The industrial revolution in many parts of the West was the key development. Its emergence was slow – the term industrial revolution was introduced into the English language only in the 1870s. Traditional production continued, and might even expand for a while to help supply industrial cities; the construction industry, only gradually affected by new methods and relying heavily on artisanal skills, was a case in point. But change ultimately won out wherever industrialization occurred, bringing new technologies, new forms of organization, even a redefinition of work itself.

The industrial revolution quickly generated global impacts, though it also created major new divisions between regions that industrialized directly and other parts of the world. In the latter, industrial competition undermined or reduced many traditional forms of employment, particularly manufacturing by hand. But it also created new pressures to increase outputs of food supplies, raw materials, and some consumer goods sought by households in the West. Regional economic inequality increased and became a major factor in global relationships – ultimately, surpassing the importance of outright imperialism.

Not surprisingly, the industrial revolution created both new problems and new opportunities, particularly in the societies most directly involved but also to some extent around the world. Patterns of consumerism and leisure were substantially redefined. At the same time, somewhat ironically, new forms of poverty emerged or became more clearly identifiable. The industrial revolution also ushered in a new stage of environmental change. Opportunities and problems alike affected many aspects of social policy, though there was often a lag before the need for innovative response was even haltingly recognized.

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The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. By Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton University Press, 2001).
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Section II: Discussion Questions

Why did initial industrializations happen when and where they did?

What were the main ways industrialization changed the relationship between the West and the world during the long 19th century?

If most of the people involved had been able to vote on the subject, would they have voted for or against participation in industrialization? Give the reasons for your answers.

Why was the West ultimately unable to maintain its essential monopoly over industrialization?

Chapter 6: The Industrial Revolution and the New Technologies

Basics. The industrial revolution was one of the great transformations in the framework for the human experience. The fact that it unfolded only over several decades in any one place is, in the long run, of no real importance: massive changes were ultimately involved. The core of the process involved new technologies, and particularly the application of fossil fuel power – coal, initially – to production and transportation. The steam engine was the key invention. But new equipment also allowed more automatic operations, for example in twisting fibers into thread or adding alloys to make steel or, ultimately, in building machines themselves. Along with new technology came the organization of production into factories, where labor could be more systematically combined and regimented. From technology and factory in turn came higher per capita production: even using early powered machinery, a cotton spinner might turn out ten times the output of a manual operative. Manufacturing gained importance, with growing production, at the expense of agriculture, which also changed but with less dramatic results. With factories, cities grew, often very rapidly; Britain, the first industrializer, became half urban by 1850, the first time this had occurred in human history. Finally, industrialization quickly affected transportation. Steam ships were introduced early, though they gained transoceanic range only by around 1840; railway systems emerged from the 1820s onward. Both greatly speeded the movement of goods and revolutionized capacity.

Geography and Timing. Britain led the process, probably because it had a government particularly interested in economic growth but also because it began to run out of wood for fuel, which encouraged an early interest in new sources of power. British industrialization launched in the 1770s, and by 1850, though many traditional economic forms remained, the economy was substantially industrialized. Western Europe, headed initially by Belgium (with excellent coal supplies) and France began to copy British processes in the 1820s, as did part of the United States. Germany was not far behind, and a few other centers (in northern Italy, or around Bilbao in Spain) joined in as well. By the second half of the 19th century most of Western Europe was involved, though important regional disparities remained; the result added greatly to a sense of national competition within the region. But while pilot factories and scattered rail lines emerged elsewhere – for example, in Russia in the 1850s – industrialization outside the West emerged only at the end of the century, headed of course by Japan as well as Russia. It has been estimated that, by 1900, about 20% of the world's population was in any sense directly involved with industrial economies. The process involved sweeping change, but during this period it also remained regionally selective.

Causes. Historians continue to debate causation. Different approaches apply, depending on whether the focus is on the British lead or the more general participation of Western economies. Debate has also been sharpened by the realization that the Chinese economy, by the end of the 18th century, was almost as advanced as the British, in terms of technologies and business dynamism – yet the Chinese did not make the turn to an industrial revolution at this point. On balance, and again amid earnest discussion, three explanatory factors emerge. First, Western economies during the previous centuries had gained ground rapidly in world trade, but there was a measurable technological lag in manufacturing; efforts to catch up to Asian levels – as in the printing of cotton cloth – helped spur a more general openness to technological innovation. Leading European businessmen realized that advances in manufacturing, improving the West's competitive position, would pay off in profits. Second, Western culture, reshaped by the scientific revolution and Enlightenment, provided important support for the idea of change and material progress. And third, Western colonies, particularly in the Americas, provided profits for investment and supplies of materials – such as cotton, when transplanted into the United States South – which no other society could initially rival. How these factors combined, what priority to give each one, is still an analytical challenge. And how other factors – such as the burst of new consumer interest in Europe itself during the 18th century – added in may add to complexity.

Latecomers. When other societies began to join the industrialization process, as with Japan, they faced a distinctive mixture of advantages and disadvantages. They could copy their more advanced Western rivals, and study visits plus direct involvement by Western businesspeople played a key role. By 1914 half of Russian factory industry was foreign-owned. On the other hand, later industrializers faced massive competition, plus the need to find capital in order to import the most advanced technology. In most latecomer industrializations, government played a larger role in spurring initial investments and organizing pilot projects. In Russia, expansion of exports of raw materials and grain helped pay for new equipment. Japan sponsored the rapid growth of a silk industry, displacing China and using large numbers of young women workers forced into low-wage operations. Tactics of this sort could be successful, but they required a different pattern of innovation.

Strain and Gain. Industrialization, when successful, could pay off in higher living standards, at least for part of the population, and certainly rising profits for a new upper middle class. It provided governments with new sources

of revenue and the more rapid production of military weapons; and trains – first used for this purpose extensively in the American Civil War – could move troops with new speed. But industrialization was also stressful. Factory work conditions imposed new patterns; growing cities were filled with slums; even successful business and professional people felt the stress of innovation and the potential for failure. It was a wealthy French businessman in the 1830s who noted wryly, referring to industrialization, “if progress was not inevitable, it might be better to do without it.”

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The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. By Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton University Press, 2001).

Discussion

How is the industrial revolution best defined? Are there any problems in formulating a basic definition?

What were the main causes of the industrial revolution? Why was Britain first? Why did the West precede other regions?

What were the main technological changes in the industrial revolution? How did they affect the economy as a whole? How was Japan’s route to industrialization different from the West? What was the role of the state?

Chapter 7: Industrial Work

Debates. A generation ago, historians vigorously debated whether industrialization – and particularly British industrialization – was a good thing for the working class. Many Marxists pointed to dire conditions. Housing did not keep pace with urban growth. Wages were often low, and the extensive use of women and, in early industrialization, children put steady pressure on pay levels. There were also many economic slumps. A bad harvest would raise food prices – this was not new – but also lead to lower demand for manufactured goods, which would then raise unemployment and reduce wages still further. Health conditions in the factory cities were bad, and possibly worse than people had experienced before. Against this, more optimistic historians, often eager to support capitalism, argued that industrialization lowered the prices of goods, making clothing for example more affordable to the working class. They pointed to categories of workers who did see rising pay. They noted that, by the second or third generation, the use of children began to decline, partly because machines became more complicated, partly because new laws worked to restrict factory jobs for the young. And they argued that amid rapid population growth – British population doubled between 1730 and 1800 – it was only the advent of industrialization that provided compensatory jobs. Finally – and this helps explain why the debate ultimately died down – they noted that after about 1850 living standards unquestionably began to improve for many workers.

Patterns of Work. In fact, the standard of living debate probably missed the most important, durable human problem with industrialization: the changes in the nature of work. Workers coming into the factories from a background in farming or craft production faced a number of changes, and on the whole the changes expanded over time. First was the question of skill and meaning. Most factory jobs were semi-skilled; a worker needed a few months' experience to reach peak productivity, but elaborate skills, that could provide bargaining power and pride, were confined to a minority. Also, as factories began to break down the production process, workers might have trouble identifying any clear product from their labors, in contrast to traditional peasants or artisans. Second, even more directly, was the question of pace. Factory work moved at the speed of machines, with little allowance for human frailty. Work now ran by the clock, and informal breaks were discouraged. Each generation of equipment moved more rapidly than the previous one, for industrialization involved steady doses of technological change. Third was the issue of supervision. In factories, even the small early versions, workers were increasingly bossed by foremen, with no ability to set their own work patterns and, with some exceptions, little hope of rising to a position of greater autonomy later in life. On balance – and it is important to allow continued debate – many industrial jobs were probably more unpleasant than their traditional counterparts had been. Many workers complained of nervous exhaustion or a sense of alienation, in a pattern that has continued ever since in industrial societies.

Wider Impacts. While the new work conditions applied particularly to factories, they could have wider results. Craftsmen – for example, construction workers – faced attempts to speed up their work and impose more formal supervision. By the later 19th century, with the expansion of managerial bureaucracies, a new group of white collar workers – secretaries, bank tellers and the like – were also regimented under new supervision, and urged to speed things up. Sales forces – for example, in the expanding department stores – also encountered new working conditions. New work habits could also spread outside the industrial regions. Rural workers, in places like Latin America, saw employers often trying to reduce the number of traditional holidays, in order to accelerate production.

Responses. Workers were often quite aware of the changes around them, and deeply concerned. Some simply left the factories, either permanently or temporarily during harvest times, or changed jobs frequently. Many women in the working class left the factories upon marriage, though some did not have this option. Many workers sought to protest. Early industrialization, everywhere, saw new efforts at unionization and strikes, directed at improving conditions. But there were significant limits to this option, particularly in the initial industrial decades: all early industrializers, from Britain later to Russia or Japan, tried to make most worker organizations illegal; in Britain the Combination Acts of the 1790s accomplished this purpose, and began to be eased only in the 1820s. Over time, larger union movements and, often, socialist parties would pick up on worker grievances, but the process was gradual. A final option for many workers, when industrialization began to generate clear profits, was to turn to an approach called “instrumentalism,” either as individual workers or through labor movements. In instrumentalism workers would agree to accept changes in work conditions, including even a higher pace, in return for greater rewards off the job – most obviously in higher pay, but also through reduced hours. White collar workers, later in the 19th century, were even more eager to enjoy new consumer options, and employers urged this group not to identify with characteristic labor grievances, urging them to see themselves as part of a middle class. Various combinations, developed by different groups of workers or encouraged by management, resulted from the changing

nature of industrial work. Here was one of the most important, and lasting, human faces of this new economic system.

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Discussion

What caused regional differences in standards of living during the industrial revolution?

Were changes in the nature of work more or less important than living standards issues, for the people most directly involved with industrialization?

How did workers try to resist industrialization or the key problems industrialization caused? What were the main goals of protest? What results did protest have?

What kinds of changes did industrialization bring to groups less directly involved – other social classes, other regions of the world?

How did industrialization affect the experiences of women? Of children?

Chapter 8: Regional Economic Inequalities

The Background. Several regions of the world were already economically differentiated before industrialization began. Most obviously Latin America, and also the United States South, had been led to focus on raw materials or food production, often using slave or estate labor, winning relatively low prices for their output. In contrast, Western Europe, exporting guns or artisanal products, like furnishings for the mansions of the landowners, earned greater profits; they also organized the commercial companies and shipping that carried the transregional trade, benefitting from these operations as well. Parts of eastern Europe such as Poland, exporting cheap grains to the West and using serf labor, fell into a similar pattern, as did West Africa with the slave trade. In all these cases individuals in the dependent economies, like the landowners, might make a handsome income, but the region as a whole lost ground. Regional economic inequality, in other words, was not an industrial invention.

The Problem. But Western industrialization made the disparity worse, both for regions already involved and for other areas, notably many parts of Asia, that had not been embraced by the unequal relationships previously. A data point suggests starkly suggests the change. In 1800 the average Mexican had a living standard about 2/3 as high as the average resident of the new United States. In 1900, that figure was 1/3, as Mexican labor had been pressed by even lower wages and worse conditions, and as many Americans had benefited from greater industrial prosperity. Overall, a clear and growing gap between industrial and nonindustrial economies emerged steadily during the long 19th century, and it did not end in 1914. Only a few economies, as with Japan, managed to escape the pattern.

Dependent Economies. Western industrialization led to new pressures and opportunities for Latin America. A growing Western consumer market eagerly sought greater access not only to sugar but now to coffee and other food products. More and more workers, and more and more land, began to be devoted to this production, in the process helping to keep prices and wages low, often falling. At the same time alternative jobs – for example, producing clothing by hand – were increasingly pressed by low-cost factory products from Western Europe or the United States. Industry also sought new levels of mineral production. Africa faced a different set of challenges, but ultimately with similar results. The region's classic trade good, slaves, was now restricted. Britain sought to abolish the Atlantic slave trade in 1808, and while some traffic continued the rates fell rapidly. The question was, how could African merchants and governments compensate, to seek revenues that would pay for manufactured imports? One answer was a rapid increase in the production of vegetable oils, but also an expansion in the use of slaves within Africa in order to keep costs down. With imperialism, later on in the century, African labor was also pulled into mining, the production of cotton and other endeavors, again supplying industrial markets at relatively low prices.

Asia. Patterns in Asia were different, in part of course because Asian manufacturing was better established. But factory imports undercut many options. Traditional manual labor in textiles, for example, declined rapidly in India, though some sectors persisted amid rapidly declining pay. As in Latin America, the process of considerable “deindustrialization” was underway. In the Ottoman Empire, Western demand for certain products, like “oriental” rugs, encouraged some traditional output; and both local and Western manufacturers set up factories to churn out copies, providing some contact with industrial operations but, always, with every low levels of pay involved. And pressure to produce exports for Western industry – as with expanding rubber plantations in southeast Asia – replicated many of the conditions characteristic in Latin America. An economic gap between the West and much of Asia began to emerge clearly during the long 19th century. This was one key reason that large numbers of Asians began to look for opportunities to emigrate, like the Chinese workers widely employed in building railroads in the western United States.

Response. During the long 19th century itself, few non-Western regions devised a systematic response to the growing regional economic inequalities. Japan was the great exception, though it too relied on low wage labor to build its silk cloth exports. Many countries became increasingly indebted to Western banks, and many built rail lines mainly to expedite the shipment of foods and raw materials, rather than to create a more rounded economy. In some regions, like Central America, large foreign enterprises, like the United Fruit Company, gobbled up land and labor to produce goods for export. Regional economic inequality was not necessarily a permanent legacy of the long 19th century, but it was a vivid one, and would be addressed only with great difficulty later on.

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Discussion

How did the results of political independence affect Latin American response to European industrialization?

How and why did the economic relationship of India and Europe change, both before and after the early industrial revolution?

Using southeast Asia as an example, discuss the impact of changing global economic relationships on social structures and on the environment during the long 19th century.

How were economies in colonial areas at a disadvantage globally despite producing lucrative global commodities? In what ways did capital empower technological development and subsequent economic growth?

Why were the settler societies, including the United States, able to forge a distinctive economic relationship to industrial Europe?

Chapter 9: Consumerism and Leisure

Background. Consumerism – the acquisition of goods to be enjoyed, or used as signs of status, not necessary to subsistence – goes well back in human history. Many aristocracies, though initially established on the basis of military prowess or control over land, developed distinctive consumer patterns, acquiring luxury goods, wearing fashionable clothing. Urban middle classes – for example, in China during the Song dynasty – often flaunted consumer gains as well, though sometimes governments turned against them, even punishing some by death for their frivolity and defiance of social hierarchy. In the West, consumer opportunities increased in the early modern period, as many people for example began to enjoy products like sugar, coffee, tea and chocolate that came from expanding foreign trade.

A Consumer Revolution? Until recently most historians, if they dealt with consumerism at all, assumed that new levels of purchasing constituted a result of industrialization, expanding in the later 19th century as industrial profits became clearer, wages began to rise, and manufacturers also sought new markets for their endlessly expanding output. But in what constitutes a major discovery, historians have realized that the first modern consumer revolution actually predates the industrial revolution, taking shape in the 17th and earlier 18th centuries. Growing interest in more fashionable clothing was one symptom. Many people, where they had the means, wanted to seem more stylish, eager to pick up colorful cotton goods for example instead of drab conventional garb. Thefts of clothing, as well as growing second hand markets, reflected the spread of demand. Home furnishings commanded new interest, including tea and coffee sets to provide greater opportunities for domestic ritual around the once-exotic products. A growing interest in comfort brought widespread purchases of items like umbrellas. Overall, rising consumerism was one of the clear sources of demand for higher manufacturing outputs. New cloth factories rushed to respond. So did manufacturers of china, like Josiah Wedgwood in Britain who by the later 18th century set up an elaborate sales apparatus to test demand for products from his factories.

Next Steps. Consumer demand spread further, of course, as industrialization took hold. A key symptom – but also a cause of further interest – was the department store, first introduced as a combination of small shops in Paris in the 1830s. Department stores featured a great variety and profusion of goods, tempting appetites with appealing displays. Consumerism also spread as an expression of new instrumentalism at work: more of life must now be justified by satisfactions off the job, and rising consumerism was a key response. Lower middle class people converted to consumerism even more rapidly than workers, enjoying opportunities to pick up on middle-class clothing styles, often developing new interests in products like cigarettes. Other new products – bicycles were a key example, or the imported carpets from the Middle East – both reflected and promoted consumerism in Western cities.

Leisure. By the middle of the 19th century a key aspect of consumerism involved watching other people perform – increasingly, professional athletes or entertainers. This was not brand new; circuses, for example, had provided amusement in several cultures. But the beginnings of professional sports, like soccer football in Britain, baseball in the United States, introduced important new elements. So did the rise of popular theater, like music halls in Britain or vaudeville in the United States, where entertainers offered music, comedy and other fare. By 1900, these styles began to spill over into early motion pictures. Some of these programs started in working-class sections of cities but then attracted middle-class patrons as well. The expansion of professional entertainment reflected higher wages, but also the need to have amusements to spice the week or month. It also reflected a decline in working hours, as the first phase of industrialization ended. Increasingly, days were divided between periods of work and periods of rest or entertainment (with a sleep portion as well), and professional entertainment moved into that space.

Further Inducements. The rise of modern consumerism was greatly facilitated by the concomitant rise of newspapers. Most major Western cities had at least weekly papers by the mid-18th century, and these featured rather prosaic advertisements for goods and services tucked within the new columns. Some featured additional testimonials from the rich and famous, attesting to the qualities of this razor strop, that patent medicine. By the later 19th century, improvements in printing, literacy and the overall standard of living facilitated the emergence of the mass press, complete with blaring headlines and sensationalist stories – and eye-catching, illustrated ads. Texts in the ads became more evocative, talking of the feel of silk hose, the excitement of the latest music hall show. And professional advertising agencies launched as well, as in the United States during the 1870s. It became increasingly difficult to know how much consumerism emanated from the real or imagined needs of ordinary folk, how much was created by the new masters of illusion.

Global Implications. The West offered the clearest haven for new consumerism and entertainment, because of the needs and opportunities created by urban, industrial economies. But Western forms had wider influence. Department stores, for example, cropped up in Russia and, by the 1890s, Tokyo and Shanghai as well. They sometimes roused attack, as undesirable foreign influences. Or, as in Shanghai, their Western-style offerings were not seen as relevant to many locals. Asian department stores often offered concerts or other entertainment as additional lures. Sports spread as well. British businessmen played amateur soccer games in places like Buenos Aires, and the interest caught on, with local teams emerging. The International Federation of Association Football formed in 1904, though initially with a mainly European focus, as symptom and promoters of the internationalization of sport. Baseball spread to parts of Latin America and Japan. Russians, interestingly, introduced both soccer and early movies to China, through the northern city of Harbin. There were hints in all this of a global consumer culture that would obviously pick up steam as the 20th century opened.

Downsides. The spread of consumerism raises important questions. Were people being encouraged to pursue superficial interests, that were less meaningful than the activities of more traditional societies? Were important artistic or religious customs being lost to the new entertainment? There was no question that some of the new interests could go overboard. A symptom of consumerism both in Western Europe and the United States, by the 1870s, was a brand new disease called kleptomania, where people, mainly middle-class women, stole goods they did not need out of a sense of emotional compulsion. Modern consumerism was an important development, ultimately a global one though with regional variations; its interpretation warrants serious analysis as part of grasping the innovations of the long 19th century in world history.

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Discussion

How did shopping change in the long 19th century?

What are the main issues in figuring out the relationship between new forms of consumerism and industrialization?

What caused the new forms of consumerism, in the West and in other regions?

What was the relationship between consumerism and colonialism/imperialism? In what ways did colonizers and colonized differ over participation in consumerism?

How did department stores contribute to social changes or represent social changes? What types of customers shopped there?

How did forms of consumption like the department store change when spreading to other regions?

Chapter 10: Poverty

Framework. The Impacts of industrialization, with their regional variations, partially redefined the nature of poverty. In some cases, poverty actually increased, despite industrialization's potential for greater prosperity. The debate over living conditions in early industrial Britain highlights key problems in interpreting poverty, with gains in some areas, such as clothing, counterbalanced by housing conditions in crowded urban quarters. Urban poverty gained new attention, because of the growth of cities and the potential for popular unrest. But rural poverty probably posed a greater problem.

The Countryside. Two factors drove greater poverty in many rural areas, in various parts of the world. First, factory production preempted many opportunities for local manufacture, where peasants – often, particularly peasant women – could work at least part-time in producing thread, cloth or simple tools. Adding to the pressure was major population growth in many places, which often outstripped available land. Underemployment became a chronic rural problem in places like Latin America, Russia and India. Ultimately, migration to cities or emigration to other regions provided at least a partial response.

Exploitation. Efforts to increase output and cut costs affected the lives of many rural workers, particularly in export sectors like cotton. After the abolition of slavery in various parts of the Americas, plantations continued to employ labor, seeking the lowest wages possible and often interrupting work to adjust to changes in demand or simply the seasons of the year. New systems of control kept conditions poor. In parts of Mexico, the southern United States and elsewhere, debt peonage gave estate owners opportunities to offer miserable wages. Workers were required, in these cases, to buy goods from a plantation store, often falling into debt and obligated to remain in the job, regardless of pay, until the debt was paid off. They were effectively enslaved once more, but to “owners” who felt less responsibility for their maintenance than had many traditional masters.

Slumps. Periodic economic downturns were not new, and traditionally had mainly resulted from bad harvests, which reduced food supply. By the later 19th century this pattern began to be altered, as a new kind of economic depression emerged. The first “modern” depression was a brief one, in the 1850s, but a longer one occurred in the 1870s and another in the 1890s. In these slumps, the trigger was usually a bank failure, when banks had invested too boldly, and neither consumer demand nor production could keep pace. Bank failures reduced investment funds, which curtailed industry, putting many people out of work and reducing wages for those who kept their jobs. And the problems were increasingly global: a failure in one place would impact both industry and export agriculture literally around the world.

New Urban Categories. Industrialization may have exacerbated economic problems for certain key groups, and not just in its earliest phases when urban misery was most acute. Women might be newly vulnerable. Their pay, in the cities, was well below the level offered to men. Efforts to regulate women's hours, though intended as a benefit, might actually reduce their employability. In fact, in most industrial cities, domestic service was initially the largest source of employment. Marriage instability, with rising rates of divorce and abandonment – a fairly common pattern, affecting even Japan around 1900 – created economic hardship for some women as well. Older workers, male as well as female, were also vulnerable. Although new machinery reduced the need for physical strength, it did not eliminate it, and many employers believed (sometimes incorrectly) that older workers were incapable of keeping up with the pace of modern industry or the need for new skills. Older workers were frequently fired or underemployed, expanding another poverty category.

Responses. Recognition of poverty problems was slow in coming, and in fact there was little policy response to issues of rural poverty of any sort, in any world region, other than the attack on slavery. Many middle-class people, in the industrial cities, focused primarily on the challenges of modern business or professional life. They were also affected by a widespread belief in the power of work and the responsibility of individuals to take advantage of opportunity; in this work ethic, the problem of poverty was really a question of laziness, excessive drinking or gambling, or some other issue – the economic system was not at fault. In this vein, countries like Britain tried to make assistance to the poor more difficult and demanding, to discourage slacking. Over time, however, with greater understanding, more overall prosperity, and growing concern about the rise of worker protest including socialism, some other responses began to emerge. Famously, in the 1800s, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck sponsored new welfare measures, providing limited state assistance for the unemployed, the ill, or the elderly. Many other countries followed suit in developing new forms of social insurance, though with various specific emphases. The results were initially limited, for few workers actually qualified and the assistance was meager, but the principle

of a welfare response to what began to be called “the social question” in industrial societies was beginning to take hold.

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What contributed to poverty besides wage levels? What were some key regional differences in poverty?

How did poverty affect women in this period? What were the results of their involvement in industrialization?

How and why did industrialization contribute to rural poverty globally?

What were some of the forms of slavery in the early 19th century?

Chapter 11: Environmental Change

New Patterns. Human activities had affected the environment before. Unduly intensive farming could wear out soils, and the introduction of domesticated animals to new regions could affect plant life. But the industrial revolution created major new potential for environmental change. During the long 19th century the results mainly affected individual regions; global environmental change was still in the future. Realization even of regional effects came slowly; the focus on technological innovation and social problems tended to preempt the environmental factor.

Factory centers. New factory cities created both air and water pollution. Many factories dumped waste into local rivers, sometimes creating toxic damage to fish. Problems intensified with the rise of the chemicals industry in the later 19th century. One major German firm, established in mid-century, regularly dumped a magnesium-chlorine mixture into the Rhine River – until finally, in the 1960s, the practice was halted. Smoke poured into the atmosphere, creating new risks of respiratory disease. Here too, dangers were not initially recognized, and the desirability of industrial growth, for jobs and prosperity, long preempted any concern. The sheer growth of industrial cities, with increased human and animal waste – horses did not begin to be replaced for local hauling until after 1900 – added to pollution levels.

Responses. Few regulations directly attacked pollution during the first age of industrialization. Public health measures did however begin to improve the treatment of human waste, as first British, then other cities expanded sewer systems. The rise of suburbs, though caused by several factors, also reflected implicit environmental concerns. In the United States and Europe most fashionable suburbs located to the west of factory districts, so that prevailing winds would blow air pollution away rather than toward the affluent residents. More generally, a new interest in nature and in activities such as hiking and bicycling, and the creation of larger park systems, reflected some realization that people needed alternatives to the urban, industrial environment.

Latin America. Pressure to produce more foods and minerals for world trade created environmental changes in dependent economies as well. Planting crops not native to the region could have particularly questionable effects. Rubber plantations in Brazil thus led to soil erosion, because the root systems could not retain water. More generally, massive destructions of forests provided wood needed to fuel sugar refineries and produce crossties for local railroads. During the 19th century over 20,000 square miles of forest were cleared in southeastern Brazil alone, creating conditions for regional climate change.

Africa. Similar patterns applied in Africa, where again industrial demands encouraged new practices that challenged the local environment. Both local and foreign planters encouraged rising production of coffee, cocoa and palm oil, involving crops not native to the regions involved. Hardwood forests were cut back, both for the timber and to clear more land for agriculture. Deprivation of forest cover in turn led to growing problems with soil erosion. Deforestation also deprived the land of natural nutrients, making the use of artificial fertilizers increasingly necessary. In Portuguese East Africa, beginning at the end of the 19th century, government promotion of cotton growing created even more damage to the soil, and also deprived many villages of locations for traditional agriculture.

Disasters. In addition to systematic environmental changes, industrialization created new opportunities for accidents and disasters. Steamships frequently burst into flames and sometimes exploded outright. Railways were another source for new accidents. Factories themselves not infrequently caught fire. Major coal mining accidents were common, as the need for fuel drove pits deeper underground. The results did not, usually, produce lasting environmental damage. But they did create an interesting level of uncertainty, certainly providing a staple news category for the growing urban press.

Trajectories. Few societies could resist the basic environmental pressures, even as wealthier individuals gained some protections through suburbanization. The key problems resulted, first, from the growing use of fossil fuels, with coal predominant until the very end of the period and with little concern for what kinds of coal were used save for cost and local availability. But second, particularly outside the industrial regions, the sheer pressure to expand production, with little attention to impacts on the land or on forests, created almost as much havoc. We have no real way of calculating results on human health at the time. But it is clear, additionally, that environmental change was one of industrialization's legacies for the future.

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Discussion

What is meant by ecological globalization? What were some of the long term impacts of environmental changes that occurred in the long 19th century?

How did colonial expansion and imperial ideologies affect regional environments? Were there cases in which colonialism benefited the environment?

What was the relationship between science and environmental change during the period?

What were the most constructive responses to 19th century environmental change? To what extent did environmental ideas spread across national and regional boundaries?

Section III: Political Systems

The long 19th century saw major changes in state forms and in the nature of political loyalties and political movements. The period began – give or take a decade – with major revolutions in the West and the Americas, and it ended with scattered but important revolutions in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Political upheavals, in other words, provided bookends to the period as a whole. In addition, states ventured various major reforms, though sometimes only tentatively. More people were drawn into participation in the political process. The role of the state changes in many ways. And new commitments – the various modern isms – emerged as well. Regional, even national differences loomed large in a century of ongoing political debate, but the theme of change was widespread.

The variety of new political options was impressive, and they included in many countries the formation of political parties, institutions that had only been hinted at before. The options included the movement dubbed as liberalism, but also a conservative opposition initially called forth by the early revolutions. Radicalism, often embracing democracy – most liberals were long uneasy about extending the vote beneath the properties classes – was another early movement. Nationalism was a loyalty of another sort, though initially linked to liberalism; the nationalist impulse varied from one region to the next, sometimes promoting loyalty to established states, sometimes urging changes in existing boundaries, and it changed over time. Finally, socialism added to the political spectrum, gaining ground particularly in the second half of the period.

More quietly, but at least as fundamentally, state functions changed, and with few exceptions bureaucracies and government roles expanded. Some older functions were cast aside, or modified, but new areas included various economic and social obligations and for the first time some direct responsibility for aspects of childhood. While redefinitions of functions pressed farthest in the industrial regions, they entered into reform movements and also the administration of the European colonies.

Overall, processes of political change were clearest and most substantial in the West during the first half of this period, but then the impetus shifted increasingly toward other areas, particularly in Asia, after 1850. By 1914 there was no global agreement on what political forms were most appropriate—different movements were still battling for positions in many countries, and of course European imperialists remained unconvinced that the rest of the world could govern itself. Again, however, some shared impulses and imitations helped define political change as well.

Basic treatments (pick at least one)

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Section III: Discussion Questions

Why did the series of major revolutions end in the West by 1848? Was this a win for conservatism, a reflection of successful political change, or something else?

Why did Japan avoid the revolutionary pressures that we're building up in Russia and China by the early 20th century?

Compare the impacts of nationalism and socialism as new political movements in the long 19th century.

Chapter 12: Revolutions and Political Movements

Events and Causes. Major revolutions broke out in North America (1776) and France (1789). Revolutions or independence wars followed in Haiti and most of Latin America. A small round of revolutions resumed in 1830, and a larger set, in various parts of Europe, in 1848-9. Causes varied but always reflected the important ideas tossed up by the European Enlightenment, pointing to some kind of parliamentary and constitutional government, legal equality, and various rights including greater freedom of religion. Social grievances often added in, particularly in the larger risings, with peasants seeking full abolition of serfdom, and urban artisans seeking some political voice. Finally, nationalism played a strong role, not only in the wars of independence but in France (where the first national anthem emerged) and again in 1848, with efforts at unification in Italy and Germany and a Hungarian drive for independence.

Results. Most revolutions established a parliament, or congress. A republic briefly emerged in France, with the execution of King Louis XVI, and republics predominated in the Americas. Either through the French revolution or the 1848 risings, serfdom ended in Western Europe (and slavery in Haiti), and the legal privileges of aristocracies were curtailed. The extent of protection for freedoms of religion, speech and the press varied, but there were gains. But monarchies survived or resumed in much of Europe.

Liberalism and Conservatism. The revolutions and related movements produced durable liberal political movements throughout the Atlantic world, and formal liberalism developed in Great Britain as well. Liberals sought to defend education and advance more free trade. The radical movements shaded off from this, urging wider set of voting rights and often advocating some serious social reform. (In the United States, the Jacksonian period of the 1820s ushered in a wider commitment to universal suffrage for free males. Women's rights movements linked to liberalism and radicalism, but did not play a formal political role until somewhat later. But conservative parties also emerged, dominating Europe in the 1820s, eager to defend monarchy, church and aristocracy and often opposed to the various individual rights, eager to expand police action against dissent. Articulate conservatives urged the importance of gradual change, against revolutionary assumptions that dramatic progress was both possible and beneficial.

After 1848. Political struggles eased in the Atlantic world after 1848, though alternations between liberals and conservatives continued to involve tensions in Latin America. Liberals had won many gains throughout most of the West, but became more cautious in the face of more radical movements. In some areas, such as Germany, nationalist advances preempted a full liberal agenda. But conservatives compromised as well, accepting more nationalism, some kind of parliament, and various systems of voting rights even including full male suffrage. In many western countries attention turned away from issues of political structure, which seemed largely resolved, and toward social and imperialist questions.

The World. Broadly liberal political ideas spread beyond the West and the Americas, helping to spark political agitation in places like Russia, where one rising (the Decemberist revolt) cropped up as early as 1825, only to be forcefully repressed. New nations that emerged from nationalist agitation in the Ottoman Empire, such as Greece or Bulgaria, usually adopted a monarch (often importing a German prince as new king) but with some parliamentary body as well. Overall, however, liberalism would spread only slowly and incompletely beyond the West, and considerable regional variety persisted. Liberalism was also complicated by imperialism—which some but not all liberals opposed—for imperial regimes tried carefully to limit political expression and dissent. The age of revolution, and the movements it spawned, would have global effects, but they were quite varied.

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Discussion

What was the impact of the French revolution on different social classes? How did it transcend national boundaries?

Define 19th-century liberalism: what are the greatest complexities in this definition?

What global ideas affected independence movements in Latin America? What was distinctive about post-independence liberalism in the Latin American context?

What were the motives of liberals during the Meiji reform, and how do they compare with the motives of European liberals?

What were the main gains in democracy during the long 19th century, and why were they so limited?

Is there a common definition for conservatism in the long 19th century, or did this vary from one region to the next? (As a specific: compare Japanese and European conservatism by the end of the 19th century.)

Chapter 13: Nationalisms

The Basics. Nationalism became one of the most powerful forces in world history during the long 19th century. Nationalists worked to define and praise a distinctive national culture and identity, and usually argued as well that the nation should have a political definition – a national state. While elements of nationalism predated the period – some sense of “Englishness” existed as early as the 13th century, and even earlier China had long emphasize the importance of combining a strong state with a common Confucian culture at least for the upper classes – fullblown nationalism was new. For most people, local loyalties, religious identities, and/or a sense of obedience to king or emperor had predominated. Nationalism was a new product.

Causes. Modern nationalism emerged first in parts of Western and Central Europe. Some German intellectuals in the 18th century emphasize a distinctive German culture as against (French) Enlightenment beliefs in human rationality and uniformity. Intellectual nationalism would expand further in efforts to probe folk traditions and other culture forms in the early 19th century. Nationalism appealed to many middle-class people seeking a loyalty that provided alternatives to monarchy and aristocracy. Nationalism could also promise larger, more unified markets as against patchworks of local trade barriers. More broadly, nationalism offered appeal as urbanization increased, pulling many people away from local rituals and loyalties. Nationalism gained ground in the age of revolution. It served to rally people in the Americas against colonial rule. The French revolution, tearing down local institutions, stressed national loyalty as part of the duty of all citizens to the state. Finally, resistance to French invasions, in places like Spain, Italy and Germany, often encouraged nationalism in opposition to Napoleonic claims.

Expanded Geography. Nationalism became a leading current in a variety of places during and after the revolutionary era, partly because it had the stamp of widespread Western enthusiasm. It helped inspire Greek independence efforts against the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s, and then other, Slavic nationalisms in the same Balkan region. Nationalism fervor helped spark Italian unification in the 1850s, under the leadership of the Piedmontese state, and then Germany unification under Prussia in the following decade. By 1870 most of Europe was defined in nationalist terms, with often heated loyalties to match. A sense of nationalism began to inspire Indian reformers, seeking greater voice in the British colony, by the 1880s. The Japanese state, working to cement loyalties after the end of feudalism in 1868, combined nationalism with obedience to the emperor. By 1900 at least an intellectual interest in nationalism developed almost everywhere, including Africa and the Arab world. Nationalism was an ideal political loyalty in resistance to European imperialism, because it defined separate claims but in a language Europeans themselves were using, and it might unite various segments of the population that had been traditionally divided by social or religious barriers. It is important to note that while nationalists easily claimed that their nation was natural, they often in fact invented traditions to explain why their region or group differed from others.

Changes in Nationalism. By the late 19th century nationalism came to be associated more with conservative than with liberal political movements, though the division was not hard and fast. Initially, claims for national freedom seemed compatible with claims for individual political freedom. But after 1848 conservatives increasingly discovered that nationalism could help win popular support. Established states like Russia now sought to use nationalism to emphasize distinctions from the liberal West, and also as an alternative to radical political movements.

The Decline of Multinational Empires. By the later 19th century a great deal of nationalist agitation developed in classic empires like Russia, Austria-Hungary (the Habsburg monarchy), and the Ottoman Empire, as various cultural and ethnic groups extended their cultural self-consciousness, and, often demanded political autonomy or independence. Irish nationalism also increasingly affected British politics. In Russia and the Habsburg monarchy, not only Poles, for whom nationalism had taken root earlier, but also Ukrainians and others agitated. This in turn prompted the Russian state to stress Russian loyalty and, often, to persecute the nationalist groups. Slavic nationalisms in Austria-Hungary and in the Balkans (Czechs, Serbs, Bulgarians, others) increasingly undermined Habsburg and Ottoman rule. Here too, one set of nationalist pressures encouraged others. A Turkish nationalism arose in reactions to growing Ottoman ineffectiveness but also the claims of ethnic minorities, including not only Slavs but also Armenians and others. In several parts of Europe as well, a Zionist movement arose, seeking a national homeland for a Jewish state. Nationalism continued to help defend many established states – including the United States, once Southern separatism had been defeated in the Civil War – but increasingly it also attacked many

larger, non-national political groups that, like the Ottoman Empire, had long been devoted to considerable internal tolerance.

Impacts. Nationalism came to play a vital role in internal politics in many nations. It provided popular support for imperialism, in France, Germany and Britain. It supported westward expansion in the United States, seen as a national “manifest destiny”. It figured strongly in the new national education systems in many established countries, where national literatures and history were usually emphasized (and often exaggerated). It was a subversive element in many traditional empires. It entered into inter-state diplomacy, during the Napoleonic wars, and against during the national unifications and the American Civil War. It played a vital role in stimulating two Balkan Wars in 1912-3, directed against the Ottoman Empire but also against rival regional nationalisms; and then in leading to World War I itself.

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Discussion

What was the relationship between nationalism and liberalism? To what extent did this relationship change during the long 19th century?

What was new about nationalism, compared to earlier political loyalties? What explains the initial rise of nationalism?

What different forms of nationalism are there? What is the link between modernity and nationalism?
Industrialization and nationalism?

What role did religion play in Arab nationalism?

How did colonies utilize nationalism against colonizers? Do colonies “share” a similar history in the formation of nationalism internally?

What role did class and ethnicity play in the formation of Russian nationalism? How did the nation expand its vision to incorporate other territories? What was the ideological justification?

How and why did conservatives make increasing use of nationalism by the later 19th century?

Chapter 14: Socialisms

Emergence. Socialism was a final new political force, developing in the long 19th century. It was less important than nationalism – to which it was in principle opposed – but it gained ground significantly, particularly in the later decades of the period. While socialism in its various forms took deepest root in various parts of Europe in the period, its influence expanded.

Causes. Overall, socialist theories and movements resulted from a combination of Enlightenment principles and the impact of industrialization on regional economies and the world economy. Enlightenment ideas about basic human equality could be extended to social and economic relationships. Early industrialization convinced many intellectuals, students and workers that a radical new social system was essential to reverse new forms of economic inequality and repression.

Early Movements. In Western Europe several movements developed before 1848, often seeking to form new communities based on equality, whose influence and example, it was hoped, would spread to society more generally. Several “utopian” communities were established, mainly in North America, to show that group coordination could replace the injustices caused by private property. Socialist advocacy also emerged in the revolutions of 1848, particularly in France.

Marxism. It was Karl Marx, however, a German intellectual working mainly in Britain, who established a larger theoretical structure for socialism, claiming scientific accuracy, and helped organize socialism as an international political movement. Marx believed that history operated on the basis of one class’s control over the means of production. In earlier times the landed aristocracy had been the dominant class, but now the mantle was passing to the bourgeoisie. The stark divide now pitted business owners against a growing mass of propertyless proletarians. Workers’ labor was exploited to generate profits for the few. Ultimately this would lead to a final revolution in which workers would overturn the existing structure. After a period of proletarian dictatorship, rooting out all bourgeois elements (including religion, the “opiate of the masses), a new society would be established on the basis of approximate equality for all. With this, the need to a state would “wither away”, for states only served the ruling class; oppression would end, peace and freedom prevail. In the meantime it was essential for socialist leaders to help organize the proletariat and prepare the inevitable revolution.

Socialist Movements and Revisionism. Socialist parties began to develop on a consistent basis from the 1860s onward, usually on a Marxist platform. They became particularly strong in central Europe, where by 1914 they usually formed the largest single political party. With time, however, many socialist leaders in practice modified Marxist insistence on revolution, in a pattern known as revisionism. Still dedicated to the revolution in principle, they also worked (with other groups) for social and democratic reforms here and now. The British Labour Party, also rising at this point, was not even Marxist in principle. Here, but also in Europe, revisionism facilitated interactions between socialists and trade union leaders. One revisionist socialist even participated in a coalition cabinet in France in the 1890s, a sign of growing, if still tentative, respectability.

Geographic Expansion. Socialist influence spread gradually and unevenly. It made little headway in the United States, where business and political leaders successfully dismissed it as a foreign, and dangerous, import. Nor were there big gains in the Middle East, where among other things socialist hostility to organized religion reduced its popularity. Socialist ideas gained more widely in Latin America, and socialist advocacy played a minor role in the Mexican revolution of 1910. Asian intellectuals began to become aware of socialism in the early years of the 20th century, and a socialist party developed in Japan, though amid concerted government repression. The big period of socialism in Asia was yet to come.

Russia. Tsarist repression and the conditions of early industrialization created a strong, though largely underground, socialism movement in Russia. Various approaches included anarchism, an often violent protest against government of any sort, and a larger social revolutionary movement that sought to appeal to peasants as well as workers. Ultimately, however, Marxist-inspired movements gained greater importance and superior organization. While Marxists divided over whether revolution in Russia was possible before a full-fledged capitalist regime, Vladimir Lenin and his Bolshevik (majority) group ultimately prevailed. Lenin, working in exile, added to Marxist theory his belief that capitalism was now international, so that a proletarian revolution was possible and necessary

everywhere, and also his conviction that small secret cells, tightly organized, were essential to lead the working class.

Impacts. Socialism increasingly influenced the political process in Europe, especially in encouraging welfare reforms and greater latitude for unions. Socialism also continued to frighten some political leaders, encouraging repression and also efforts to distract, for example through nationalist policies abroad. Widespread fears that socialists would resist the war effort in 1914 proved largely inaccurate, as most leaders accepted the war and even participated in coalition governments. But socialist movements would also influence the course of the war especially when they seized control of the revolutionary effort in Russia in 1917.

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Discussion

What were the main causes of the development of socialism? Was it fundamentally an Enlightenment based theory?

Were most members of the working class in favor of revolution by the later 19th century?

Why was Marxism so successful as a theory? What role did science have in Marxist thought?

How did traditional Marxist thought change by the 20th century? In what ways did Russian thinkers build upon Marxist thought?

What were some key regional differences in the nature and position of socialism by the later 19th century?

What were the main results of socialism in political and social relations by 1914?

Chapter 15: The Functions of the State

Patterns. Changes in the functions of government, though less obvious, were as significant as the shifts in political structure and political movements. Almost everywhere, government activities expanded steadily – despite some liberal interest in cutting back. Only Britain and Norway, briefly at mid-century, reduced state expenditures. Elsewhere, bureaucracies grew and became more specialized. In Western countries, training and testing for government officials gained over connections based on privilege of birth. Most important, the greater scope of activities expanded the contacts between state and citizenry.

The Economy. Governments took on new economic roles. Responsibilities for infrastructure included, in most countries, direct involvement in the construction and in some cases the operation of railway systems. Governments began to sponsor technical expositions and generally sought to promote technological change. This was a key feature of Muhammad Ali's industrialization effort in Egypt, and figured even more prominently in Japan's reform moves; the Japanese government even ran model enterprises directly, particularly in heavy industry. While government growth was especially noteworthy as part of the expansion of industrialization, it also applies in colonial settings. The colonial regime in India, for example, sponsored railway development from the 1850s onward, for economic and military purposes alike.

Regulation and Public Health. Again beginning in the West, governments began to establish new oversight for safety conditions and hours of work, particularly in the factories. Enforcement lagged behind legislation, but factory and housing inspections expanded by the later 19th century, under auspices of both national and urban governments. City governments often led in other efforts to promote public health, for examples with new sewer systems. Parks and other public facilities received increasing attention.

Education. Schooling was a crucial new responsibility. Previously, education had been left mainly in the hands of families and religious organizations – Chinese bureaucratic training was the most obvious exception. But now the state stepped in, often displacing and certainly reducing religious involvement. Beginning in the 1830s, as in the northern United States and France, governments began to construct full primary school systems and even to require attendance, at least in principle (again, enforcement often lagged). Japan's establishment of a universal education requirement in 1872 was one of this nation's key reform moves, introduced after study groups had visited Western Europe and the United States. More broadly, governments began to assume more responsibility for children, not only through education but through new measures to treat and hopefully rehabilitate juvenile offenders (rather than lumping them with adult criminals), and also through the establishment of urban clinics for expectant mothers and young children. By 1900 governments began to issue child rearing pamphlets, mainly on health issues but with increasing attention to socialization and "modern" discipline, on the assumption that many parents now needed the expert guidance of the state. This was an important step in the United States, under the auspices of a new federal Children's Bureau, and also in Japan.

Police and Military. Policing was not a new function, but police forces expanded and professionalized everywhere. It was in the 1820s, for example, that Britain introduced the "bobbies", so named after the government minister Robert Peel. By the late 19th century new techniques like fingerprinting added to police capacity. After 1848, riot police also began to receive more attention. Government responsibility for prisons also grew, replacing many older forms of punishment as, in many countries including Russia and the Ottoman Empire during their reform periods, the range of capital punishments decreased. Military activities were even less novel, but new weaponry and more emphasis on mass conscription expanded the government role here as well. The French revolution introduced the concept of universal military conscription in the 1790s, with the famous *levee en masse*, and many European governments began to move in this direction during the 19th century. In Russia, expanded armies also took on educational functions, trying to promote literacy.

Taxes. Inevitably, given new responsibilities, governments sought more tax revenues as part of this quiet revolution in the role of the state. In India and Southeast Asia, increased tax exactions by the colonial regimes often created major tensions with villagers, who were accustomed to lower exactions and less systematic requirements. The United States expanded its taxation administration during the Civil War, and even enacted an income tax in 1912.

Tradeoffs. As governments took on new functions, including the early welfare measures pioneered in Germany in the 1880s, some did relax some earlier roles. State enforcement of religion decline in many places, with the spread of religious freedom and the growing emphasis on secular education. The political position of the Church of England gradually declined, for example. France and Mexico went through various phases in the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church, but ultimately moved to a more secular approach particularly in schooling.

Variety. Government roles, like structures, continued to vary. Government size and functions were less extensive in the Americas, including the United States, than in Western Europe. China, historically a leader in defining the role of the state, faced increasing ineffectiveness on the part of the waning Qing dynasty, as well as extensive external interference. Colonial governments expanded their role – in British India, the administration even began to introduce some reforms in the treatment of women by the 1850s, limiting hours of work in factories and seeking to reduce child marriages – but not to the level of states in industrial or industrializing societies. Still, the interest in redefining key government functions spread widely, a major aspect of political change in the long 19th century overall.

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Discussion

What caused the expansion of public health programs? How did factors like race affect these programs?

How did growing global contacts affect the growth of the state in regions outside the West? What were the most important tensions between globalization and the state?

Discuss changes in the role of the state, and collaborations among states, in promoting internal and regional security.

How and why did states develop new responsibilities for childhood?

What was the relationship between changes in state functions and the rise of 19th century liberalism?

Chapter 16: Reforms and (more) Revolutions

Shift in Focus. As noted in the introduction, the second half of the 19th century saw the emphasis on political change shift particularly toward Asia and the Russian empire. It was here that the key political questions emerged, now that greater stability marked the West. Some of the issues were familiar from the earlier Western experience itself, including questions about constitutional and parliamentary limits on royal power. Others however marked a different set of political traditions and social problems. On the whole the regions held as outright colonies did not yet generate consistent agitation, despite some nationalist development: the key focus was on states that were at least technically independent.

Japan. Japan faced a crucial set of issues after the arrival of Western fleets, and accompanying pressure to open the national market, from 1853 onward. Intense debate included near civil war in the 1860s, between forces defending the existing, shogunate, government and those urging reform. The latter won out, and in 1868, under the new “enlightened” (Meiji) emperor, feudalism and the formal aristocracy were abolished and Japan entered into its period of reform and globalization. Ultimate results included a constitution and parliament (1881), based on limited suffrage, but also intense new emphasis on the symbolic power of the emperor and the citizen obligation of obedience. Education was massively reformed, not only through mass schooling but also a new emphasis on science and technology; but a brief interest in other Western educational norms was pulled back in the 1880s, in favor of highlighting national solidarity and community values. Japanese reforms created a new upper class of some former aristocrats and new top business leaders. It also generated a very effective state, complete with a modernized military and the growing capacity to industrialize.

China and the Ottoman Empire. In other key cases, political changes were more limited or more short-lived. The Chinese government responded to new Western pressure, from the Opium War onward, with protests against interference but little major change. The regime emphasized tradition, and actually resisted many efforts at technological change – the first railway line built by a private firm was actually torn up. Growing inefficiency and massive social unrest complicated responses. Only gradually were some Western advisors brought in to help with military change and, ironically given the Chinese political past, more efficient tax collection. Patterns were initially different in the Ottoman Empire. The 1839-1876 Tanzimat reform period included changes in the legal codes, a clearer commitment to religious tolerance, and equality under the law; a constitution was issued in 1876, providing for a parliament. But the experiment did not last long, and in the final decades of the period the regime returned to a policy of repression, along with renewed emphasis on the commitment to Islam.

Persia. Persia, ruled by an autocratic shah in the Qajar dynasty, faced growing pressures for change from aristocrats, Islamic religious groups and merchants, all worried about authoritarianism. The situation was further complicated by massive pressures from Russia and Britain which effectively divided the country, and its growing oil industry, into spheres of foreign control. In 1905-6 a near revolution broke out, with considerable violence. The Shah granted a constitution and set up a parliament based on limited suffrage. Efforts to increase government effectiveness, however, were blocked, particularly by the Russians who vetoed a new finance minister. And the reforms did not resolve key political issues, which carried over into the 1920s.

Russia. The Russian reform period, from 1861 to 1881, was marked by a new, more moderate tsar and the need to react to the nation’s loss in the Crimean War. The abolition of serfdom was a huge change, though because of the required repayment to the nobility it did not content the peasantry. The move brought the need to set up new local governments to replace local aristocratic control, which gave some Russians new political experience. Other changes included substantial legal reform, reducing the harshness of penalties, and more merit-based recruitment in the military. And of course the government began more effectively to promote industrialization. But the full reform period ended in 1881, when the tsar was assassinated by a terrorist (anarchist) bomb. Political repression resumed. Loss in war with Japan, along with reactions to repression and peasant and worker grievances, brought outright revolution in 1905, which forced the tsar to set up a parliament; but by 1907 this measure was essentially nullified, and the government returned to substantial police repression of both radical and minority nationalist movements.

Revolutions. Most historians believe that another revolution was inevitable in Russia, given the tensions between tsarist autocracy and demands for change; but the outburst would not come until 1917, further prompted by the hardships of World War I. But a substantial 1911 revolution in China was a major development, prompted by the arrival of a new, young and vulnerable emperor and the accumulation of grievances about government inefficiency,

foreign influence, and the lack of significant change. The government tried to fend off the revolt by promising a constitution and an “examination” of other aspects of Western government, but the move did not work. The age-old empire was abolished and a reformer, Sun Zongshan, hurried back to China to take over a provisional, republican government. This only began the process of revolution in the giant country, but there was no turning back. Finally, a long period of one-man rule in Mexico, as the ruler aged, surfaced a combination of liberal grievances about lack of freedom and representation, plus massive peasant and worker concerns and a general resentment about the extent of United States influence, in the revolution of 1910 which, ultimately, set Mexico’s distinctive political course for most of the coming century.

Issues Unresolved. Much of Asia, eastern Europe and at least parts of Latin America ended the long 19th century not a note of irresolution. Traditional political systems were not working. At the same time it was not clear that Western-style liberal measures were the answer, or that they had really wide support. Deep social grievances added to the complexity. Japan had demonstrated that substantial reform could be effective, not only in preserving independence but in fending off revolt, but its example was almost unique. A host of questions were well established: about how to redefine government structure and, in many cases, deal with conflicting internal nationalities claims. The answers however would await the next period, and in some cases have yet to be firmly established even today.

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Discussion

What were the main directions of political reform in Asia in the later 19th century?

Why did reform periods end in Russia and the Ottoman Empire?

Why were reforms more successful in Japan than in most Asian countries?

What historical changes caused the Persian Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century? What groups of people led it and called for reform?

How did the Tanzimat reforms affect the major social groups in the Ottoman Empire?

What were the main results of Russia's 1905 revolution?

Section IV: Social Change

From a world history standpoint, social developments in the long 19th century are obviously complicated by the increasing division between the industrial regions and the larger areas that remained largely agricultural.

With industry, class structures began to change substantially. The growth of factories, and accompanying expansion of the professional ranks of lawyers, doctors and, now, engineers, a reasonably coherent middle class began to expand. Criteria for membership in the class included ownership of considerable, but non-landed property (the business group) and an increasing claim to expertise and educational achievement (the new definition of the professions). Middle-class outlook was hardly unified, but included substantial belief in the work ethic and, often, at least vaguely liberal political views, plus some common family practices. Along with this, an even larger factory working class emerged, alongside but differentiated from the more traditional ranks of urban artisans. Finally, late in the century, the white collar ranks began to expand, often linked in values and styles of dress with the middle class but decidedly different in terms of working conditions and mobility prospects.

But these social changes did not carry over to most of the rest of the world. With early industrialization an identifiable middle class began to expand in Russia, but it was much smaller and more insecure than its Western counterpart. And there was no equivalent to industrial-style social change in China, or in most of Africa or Latin America.

Even in industrial countries, social change was in many ways gradual. Large rural classes, and of course the urban artisans, persisted. They were not changeless: artisanal conditions shifted as master craftsmen began behaving more like employers and stepping up the pace of work. Even more important, artisans were also deprived of the protection of the traditional guilds, as guild restrictions were abolished as part of liberal, pro-industrial reforms. The same attack on artisan protections occurred in Japan at the end of the 19th century. Rural life changed as well. Agricultural populations began producing more for the market – railroads could play a key role in stimulating new sales, and peasants also began to see new value in formal education for their children. But there were also strong ties to tradition. At the top of society, in much of the industrial world, the aristocracy, the traditional upper class, held on surprisingly well. Of course their incomes were now rivaled by big business, which was challenging. And in most Western countries their legal status changed greatly, with the advent of equality under the law. But aristocratic groups managed to maintain a distinctive lifestyle and often used political power, even with expanded voting, to protect their economic interests. We can see in hindsight that conditions for aristocrats were eroding, but their position, and their active counterthrusts, remained significant at the time.

From a global standpoint, the most striking change during the first industrial age was the surprising movement to abolish slavery and, often, serfdom. Long-established, highly traditional forms of labor were dramatically called into question. The results were perhaps less striking than the changes in law, but changes were very real, and increasingly international.

Urbanization forms a second key theme, though of course there were big differences between city growth with industrialization and the slower evolution of cities and urban populations in other parts of the world.

Gender relations came in for serious review. Again, Western countries led the way, ultimately generating a formal feminist movement for the first time in world history. But Western influence and internal social changes also raised new gender issues in places like Russia and China. Imperialism had its own, sometimes contradictory, impacts on gender. There was no single pattern of gender change in the period, but shifts, debates and reconsiderations were actually quite widespread.

Finally, childhood came in for new discussion. Industrialization forced debates about children, beginning of course with child labor. Some of the results carried over into other parts of the world, where Western example or a desire to avoid industrial-style exploitation of children prompted novel measures. Again, it would be an exaggeration to say that a global pattern emerged, but children were on the agenda in new ways in many places.

Historians have debated how much emphasis should be placed on social change, since so many people, even in the industrial world, lived much as their ancestors had done even by 1900. An analytical balancing act is unquestionably essential. But several lines of development did attack earlier patterns, even across the industrial-less industrial divide. These combined with other shifts, such as the expansion of consumerism, to create more than mere outlines of a new social order.

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Section IV: Discussion Questions

What are the main complexities in assessing the actual impact of the emancipations of slaves and serfs in the long 19th century?

Despite the huge differences between industrializing and nonindustrial regions, were there some common social trends in the long 19th century?

What are the principal challenges in dealing with changes and continuities in the situation of women in 19th-century world history?

In what ways did governments gain a greater role in shaping social trends during the long 19th century?

Chapter 17: Emancipations: Causes and Impacts

Timing. From the mid-18th century onward, a new current of opinion – it becomes possible now to talk about “public opinion” – began to agitate against slavery and the slave trade, initially primarily in the Atlantic world. A number of new organizations sprang up, like the British Abolition Society, founded in 1787, urging that governments halt the trade and abolish the institution. The groups combined some central organization with some local branches, around the intense belief that slavery was “repugnant to the principles of justice and humanity.” Groups staged marches, circulated petitions – often gaining thousands of signatures in major cities. Britain had the most active effort, but movements sprang up in France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia – the Danish government curtailed its participation in the slave trade by 1792 – and the northern colonies of British North America including Canada. Agitation was sporadic, but it continued strongly into the 19th century, when it began to bear fruit.

Causes. Historians have debated the factors behind this innovative campaign. Intellectual and religious stimulation unquestionably mattered. The Enlightenment proclaimed human freedom and the dignity of all peoples, and slavery was obviously incompatible. Minority Protestant groups combined from another angle, with Quakers and Methodists taking a lead. One historian has called the result a revolution in “humanitarian sensibility.” Were there other factors? Slavery was probably not becoming economically obsolete; it could still be profitable, so one line of explanation probably does not apply. Slave revolts certainly spurred concern, particularly in some regions. Explanations may also need to include some dose of escapism. Antislavery movements developed just as the industrial revolution was beginning to change conditions in many Western cities: were middle-class advocates eager to direct attention to evils on the other side of the world? Were the many workers involved in the petition efforts taking out their own frustrations by striving for some other noble cause? It is also worth remembering that slavery in the Americas was much harsher than the traditional institution in other parts of the world, which may have helped draw attention. Figuring out why people, initially in the West, began showing new concern for other groups, with which they had no clear ties of ethnicity or culture, is not an easy task. But there is no question that a clear energy was building: as a British newspaper put it, “*Vox populi, vox dei*, slavery shall be no more.”

Early Impacts. As the movement continued to heat up after 1800, it began to gain some concrete results. The Haitian revolution of 1796, inspired in part by Enlightenment ideals, eliminated the institution. Britain moved to abolish the transatlantic trade in 1807, and while this did not shut things down entirely, it had real effects. Several Latin American countries (all with little stake in the institution) abolished slavery during the independence wars, as did some northern states in the new United States. Argentina did not end slavery outright, but decreed that the children of slaves should be freed. The French Revolution of course abolished serfdom, a milder though similarly coercive institution. Russian intellectuals, influenced by Western ideals, began agitating against harsh serfdom in that country, arguing that it was unjust but also economically counterproductive, in that serfs had no motivation to work hard; several were sent to Siberia as punishment for their views. Debate in the United States famously became quite fierce, with Southern planters (like Russian landowners) passionately defending the traditional institutions, in part on grounds that slaves or serfs would be incapable of governing themselves if they were freed from the beneficent control of the landowners. Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in 1733, with huge impact in places like Jamaica.

Continued Effort. Anti-slavery and anti-serfdom arguments continued to gain ground. Abolitionists increasingly dramatized the plight of slaves, depicting cruel slave auctions and separations of family members; new products like Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, widely disseminated and also turned into moving stage plays, clearly helped the cause in many countries. The Revolutions of 1848 ended serfdom throughout central Europe. Then the Russian decision to emancipate the serfs (with a less known but accompanying measure that abolished slavery in Russia) constituted a huge step. Hesitant, but pressed by his own ethical sense and also a desire to gain public and international support for the Union cause, President Lincoln emancipated most American slaves in 1863.

Limitations. By this point, even as the movement progressed, some of its weak spots were becoming obvious. First, despite their sincere convictions, anti-slavery advocates did not necessarily care very much about what happened to former slaves after the legal institution was abolished. Jamaican ex-slaves often suffered economically, and were compelled to take low-wage, low-condition jobs. Many slaves in the American south were “freed” with little or no property, and then forced into poor jobs if they could find work at all. Russian serfs fared a bit better, but they too were constrained by repayment requirements to the nobility. The abolition of slavery and serfdom were real, but they did not advance their victims as clearly as might have been expected. Further, conditions were affected

by the masses of workers ready to take the place of coerced labor. Population growth in many parts of the world pushed many emigrants – from parts of Asia and southern and eastern Europe – to take low-paying work, sometimes with indenture arrangements that severely limited their freedom during the contractual period (usually 7 years).

Further steps

Anti-slavery efforts nevertheless persisted. A key argument for European imperialism in Africa, sincerely intended at least to a point, involved the desire to remove slavery in that subcontinent, where ironically it had at first expanded in response to the end of the international slave trade. Several African rulers, like the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1873, were persuaded to halt slavery. Major Latin American countries joined in the movement, often prodding governments to act. Brazilian reformers thus sought to “imitate every European progress, and possess each new material, moral, intellectual or social improvements of civilization.” Brazil completed the abolition of slavery in 1882. Cuba followed suit in the following decade, officially completing the process in the Americas.

Impacts and Gaps. Many problems persisted. In the first place many Middle Eastern nations, accustomed to slavery, did not agree to end the practice until the 1920s or even later, though they faced Western pressure. At least as important were the many replacement efforts, in the Americas and elsewhere. We have seen that many workers were forced into debt peonage that kept them tied to low-wage jobs. Orphans and prisoners might be compelled into no-hope labor arrangements. Workers in the African colonies were often forced into difficult work, for example in mining. The Belgian Congo developed particularly repugnant methods, including physical torture. Many international anti-slavery groups tried to fight these practices as well. The London Anti-Slavery Society worked against debt peonage in Peru, another English organization sprang up to protest conditions in the Congo. But it was an uphill battle. Slavery undoubtedly declined; there was real change. But it did not end – estimates calculate 62 million slaves in the world even today. More important, substitute arrangements may have brought little or no improvement – perhaps in some cases outright deterioration – for many former slaves. The historical calculus remains complicated.

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Discussion

What were the main causes of the rise of emancipation movements? Does religious and intellectual causation outweigh economic factors?

How and why did abolitionism spread geographically? How was serfdom as well as slavery involved?

What social groups were most involved with abolitionism?

What systems relaxed slavery and serfdom?

How do abolitionism and its results relate to wider developments in the world economy?

Chapter 18: Urbanization

Industrial Impact. For the first (and last?) time in world history, Western cities took the lead. Some of them became the largest in the world, just as the West moved toward becoming predominantly urban, for the first time anywhere. Equally important, as they grew Western cities began to introduce a variety of new features, many though not all around innovations in urban technology, which would be widely copied elsewhere. Obviously, city growth was closely related to the industrial revolution. Factory centers often expanded particularly rapidly. But the biggest cities, the pace-setters, were not mainly factory havens, but conglomerations that mixed commerce and banking, often national politics, invariably cultural opportunities. Some of these types of cities also began to emerge in other regions, in some cases before outright industrialization began. The urban history of the long 19th century was not a matter of factories alone.

Explosive Growth. From the late 18th century onward Western cities expanded very rapidly, pulling in migrants from the countryside and, in some cases, immigrants from other regions at a great rate. Factory hubs in Britain rose from tiny villages – Manchester, a textile center, was a case in point; they might grow by as much as 40% in a single decade. Rapid German urbanization took off in the 1860s, absorbing the whole national population gain. In 1870 there were eight cities with over 100,000 people, by 1900 there were 41, with several above the half-million mark. London became for a time the biggest city in the world, possibly by 1930, when it had 1.5 million people, certainly by 1851 when it had 2.4 million. And of course urban percentages of the total population forged ahead as well. The United States, a rural bastion in 1800 with only 5% of its people in cities, was 42% urban by 1910; Canada matched this growth rate.

Differentiations. As Western cities grew, they also established far firmer social lines than ever before. Traditionally, classes had mixed in the cities, with rich people and poor in the same neighborhoods, sometimes on different floors of the same building. No longer. The middle classes wanted nothing to do with the popular quarters, which they literally often found disgusting in their squalor and smell. (And also animals: the poorer families often kept goats and other animals, a practice that ended only with World War I.) So cities divided by income group, with the comfortable classes usually living in the western section so that winds would blow smoke and diseases away from them. In some places, outright suburbs developed by the 1840s, again highlighting social separations.

Amenities. Urban expansion, particularly after about 1830, was matched by other innovations. Public health reformers began to push for underground sewer systems. Water began to be piped into the more affluent homes and buildings. Lighting literally transformed cities at night. Gas lights preceded electricity, but the latter gained ground steadily after 1860, setting a framework for new kinds of urban nightlife. While most ordinary people still commuted by walking, new transportation systems were essential parts of the cities' physical expansion. Tramways and trolleys ran above ground. London pioneered the first subway, beginning in the 1860s. City streets were also widened. This facilitated transportation, and allowed the creation of elegant new boulevards on which some of the new department stores might be located. It was also a police measure, to discourage urban barricades and rioting – an approach first implemented in Paris after 1850.

Impacts. New regulations and amenities improved urban health levels, after a low point early in the industrial urbanization process. In some cases, urban health surpassed rural, again probably for the first time in history. Better control of sewage and water were crucial here, as urban leaders responded to epidemics like cholera that had literally plagued cities into the mid-19th century. Crime rates also went down, thanks to better living standards and policing. Myths about the evils of cities, the purity of the countryside, persisted, and there were certainly many problems still. But for large numbers of people, cities had become better places to live, which helps explain why urbanization continued.

Asia. The story of cities in Asia was mixed. The continent had traditionally hosted the largest and most advanced cities, but this position now yielded. Chinese cities grew as part of overall population growth, but their percentage of the population actually declined – earlier, cities had housed upward of 15% of the total, but by 1900 the figure had dropped to about 7%. But individual cities had a more distinctive experience in the period, particularly when they connected to Western trade and, in some cases, imperialism. Thus the city of Shanghai, previously little more than a village, began to be taken over by foreigners, with distinct French, British and American sectors, called concessions. Westerners built a mass of facilities along the river – the famous Bund area, and many Chinese preferred to live there as well. Western administration improved the management of garbage and tax collection, though housing

shortages and high rates of disease persisted. Singapore was founded as a British port in 1819; its population of 1000 soared to 100,000 by 1869. Calcutta, now called Kolkata, the British capital of India until 1911, served as a center also for the opium trade to China. Its 120,000 people in 1750 grew to over a million by 1900, mainly without much planning. The city mixed Hindus, Muslims and many Europeans. Many of these up and coming Asian cities also established large, Western-style hotels, another important innovation.

Elsewhere. Russian cities began to grow rapidly as part of late 19th-century industrialization, in patterns broadly similar to those of the West a bit earlier. Latin America urbanized less rapidly, and many cities remained small, organized along lines established by Spanish colonists earlier. But there were exceptions, where export industries and commercial and banking services flourished. Buenos Aires was the first Latin American city to pass a million, in 1910, and Rio de Janeiro soon followed. These cities also introduced features like tramways, and Buenos Aires even opened a subway in 1913. Mexico City, though smaller at half a million people, also changed rapidly in the later 19th century, with street cars and electric lighting. Africa was less urban still, despite a long history of market cities. Lagos Nigeria, seized by the British in 1861 from a ruler committed to the slave trade, rose from 25,000 people to 37,000 a decade later – a significant change, but only a foretaste of a real urban revolution. The new city of Johannesburg, South Africa, formed in 1886 as part of the gold rush, grew more rapidly, with 100,000 residents by 1895. It also introduced a system of racial segregation, forcing blacks into shantytown suburbs, that was actually a prelude to Apartheid.

Urban Systems. After 1870 major cities in many parts of the world began to introduce some of the same technologies as those pioneered in the West, at least for affluent section of the center city. Seoul, South Korea, opened to the wider world after long isolation, blossomed exceptionally rapidly. Streets were widened, and new companies set up trolley lines, water treatments, electricity, telegraphs and telephone, becoming perhaps the most modern city in Asia for a time. Several jointly owned American-Korean companies sponsored much of this development. Under an authoritarian ruler who spent part of his time in Paris, Caracas, Venezuela, though still small, developed spacious, Parisian-style boulevards. Istanbul (Constantinople), a class traditional urban hub, had its own facelift, despite the problems of the Ottoman Empire. New bridges were built, new palaces set up along the Bosphorus in the latest Western styles, and tram, telephone and electric light networks were established. The city grew from about 400,000 in 1800, to over a million by 1914. Many cities outside the West tended to concentrate the wealthier district in or near the urban center, with the poorer quarters, often a maze of shacks and huts, set up on the outskirts, a distinctive urban pattern that persists in many places still.

Variety. As with so many social features, great regional variety marks the urban story of the long 19th century. But the century did see, in many ways, the emergence of the modern city, in terms of systems as well as size, and while Western centers introduced most of the innovations initially they began to have literally global impact by the end of the period.

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Discussion

What were the main changes in cities during the long 19th century in addition to sheer growth?

What were the principal causes of migrations to the cities? What social groups were most likely to migrate?

What difficulties did rural migrants face in the new urban settings?

How did globalization and Western influence affect Asian urbanization? What domestic forces were involved?

What regions of the world were most affected by new patterns of urbanization? Did urbanization take different forms in different regions?

Chapter 19: Gender

Complexity. Important changes occurred in gender roles and relations during the long 19th century. It is not inaccurate, in fact, to see developments in this century as pivotal in launching a wider transformation that continues to this day. But for the 19th century itself it is also vital to grasp a number of nuances. Gender assumptions in many places were neither traditional nor contemporary. Not surprisingly, important debates occurred along with change, adding hesitations along with complexity. More obviously, huge regional differences reflected the diverse impacts of Western industrialization along with the variety of traditional frameworks about gender. Even Western influence itself, though very real, had mixed intentions as well as mixed results.

New Ideas. The gradual emergence of new thinking about women, initially in the West, is clear enough, though initial impacts were sparse. Several women in Western Europe, including Mary Wollstonecraft in Britain, translated Enlightenment principles into appeals for women's rights and legal equality at the end of the 18th century. Ironically the French Revolution, in its ultimate impact on law, reduced women's scope in the family. But women's voices increased. In the United States women's involvement in abolitionism led to related demands for rights, and there were also transatlantic meetings toward the same end. A group of women teachers pressed their claims during the French revolution of 1848. Ultimately, of course, all this would coalesce into the feminist movement, which began to take clear shape toward the end of the century, even stimulating several international (though mainly Western) organizations in the 1880s. The most intense agitation, including some violent demonstrations, occurred in places like Britain, Scandinavia, and the United States. Marxists had their own approach to gender issues, arguing that the revolution would end inequality but putting specific women's demands below those of the working class on the current agenda.

Real Changes: Part I. The actual situation for women in industrializing Western countries was complicated. In the first place, as early as the 19th century, a new cultural current began to argue that women might be, as a group, exceptionally moral, and therefore were the logical guardians of family virtues. Motherhood gained new prestige as part of this approach. This was a huge change, as against more traditional beliefs that women were more likely to be sinners, but it also placed new constraints on women – women who were not virtuous, particularly in the sexual realm, gained new hostility. At the same time, particularly but not exclusively in the middle class, women began to be removed from the formal labor force. They had lots to do in the household, and working-class women might work before marriage and then find some other ways to earn money in the home – for example, taking in boarders – but women's economic dependence on marriage probably increased. The largest urban occupation for women, domestic servanthood, was hardly something most women wanted to maintain for life.

Real Changes: Part II. Unquestionably the most important real change for women in the Western world in the mid-19th century was the gradual but inexorable expansion of opportunities for at least a basic education. Traditionally, everywhere, female literacy rates had lagged behind those of men, but this began to change. Some male conservatives resisted, but overall the argument that, in a modern society, mothers must be educated in order to raise even boys properly carried the day. And this, more than formal feminism, proved to be the entering wedge. Wherever education spread – and this remains true today – the birth rate began to decline, as women realized they had new options. And this in turn would open other new opportunities and demands. By the later 19th century, though still constrained in the work force, more women were getting jobs as schoolteachers, nurses, librarians, salespeople, and secretaries. A growing number were pressing into secondary schools and a handful, by the 1870s, emerged in the professions, as doctors and lawyers.

A Bit of a Dilemma. These developments had a complex impact on feminism. Should women tout their special virtues, as mothers or peacemakers, in asking for rights and the vote, or should they stress their equivalence with men? Middle-class reformers might also have real difficulties sympathizing with the quite different problems of their working-class sisters, for whom better jobs often counted for more than new legal rights. Still, the campaigns pressed forward, winning some support from male liberals and socialists. Women began getting the vote in scattered places, from 1868 onward: New Zealand, the territory of Wyoming, then soon after 1900 Scandinavia and Australia. Other legal changes in many countries provided new protection for property ownership and rights to divorce. The momentum was clear, even if full effects in most countries would await a later time.

Western Influence: Part I. Western example combined with internal developments to produce changes and debates elsewhere. A significant women's movement took shape in Russia, echoing Western arguments in most

ways. Japanese visitors to the West were appalled at the influence and voice women had – ironically, given the actual limitations; they had no desire to replicate this affront to male prerogative. But the 1872 education act included schooling for women, on the assumption – as in the West – that educated mothers were essential and that women could pursue special, appropriate subjects like the domestic arts. Some groups of women, in consequence, went on the secondary school and even the professions. Western missionaries set off new debates in China about footbinding, which they resolutely opposed; Chinese reformers picked up the argument, pointing to the importance of strong women in a modern society, and the practice began its decline. British colonial officials (joined by Indian advocates) moved against child marriages and the practice of *sati* in India, and various reformers, including some Western women, encouraged more education for Indian women. Western example set off a vigorous debate in Egypt beginning in the 1890s, about veiling. Some reformers insisted that veiling was a backward practice, that women needed more public freedom, but others, including many women, saw the veil as a confirmation of Egyptian tradition and an appropriate symbol of resistance against undue Western influence.

Western Influence: Part II. But the role of the West was not simply an encouragement to reform. There were at least three common and persistent complications. First, Western industrial competition undermined women's manufacturing work in many regions. Underemployment hit women hard in places like India and Latin America. It could reduce their position in the family; it led to major efforts to win jobs in domestic service, in the families of colonial or other officials. In Africa, the expansion of urban and mining work mainly benefited men, splitting families as many women remained behind in the village, relying on meager opportunities in agriculture. Second, in colonial regions, European officials often neglected key gender problems, seeking to avoid local opposition, but also promoted European standards that reduced traditional support for women. Again in Africa, many colonial officials disapproved of African arrangements that might encourage women's work and also gave women a strong voice in family matters; new rules, sometimes supported by African men, strengthened the positions of husbands and fathers. For two key reasons, then, women's situation in nonindustrial regions might clearly deteriorate – despite counterpressures toward reform and some new educational opportunities. Finally, Western feminists, as they sought to push for change in other regions, often had a heavy hand, regarding local women as hopelessly backward. This was a key problem in relationships between American and Latin American women's leaders; the former did not understand Latin American nationalist opposition to the overall influence of the United States in their countries, and also clearly looked down on their emerging feminist counterparts. The fact that women's efforts in Latin America also included a larger working-class component further burdened interactions.

Patterns of Change. Obviously, at a time of significant developments in gender relations, it was not surprising that regional and class differences surfaced strongly. There was no single trend line. Even newly industrial regions, like Japan and particularly Russia, followed their own script; they depended far more heavily on women's work in the factories or the Japanese silk shops than Western industrializers had done, and did not as quickly move toward greater emphasis on domesticity. In the long run, globally as well as in the West, the most important shift turned out to be the opening of new educational slots, for this would prove crucial in spurring changes in other areas. Nevertheless, by 1914 the global story line was far from clear.

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Discussion

To what extent did patriarchal attitudes and arrangements change in the long 19th century? In the West? In other regions?

How did ideas about morality and the domestic sphere affect women in the 19th century?

Discuss the diverse roles and impacts of women in 19th-century imperialism.

To what extent did feminism become global during the long 19th century? What major factors constrained the development of feminism?

Why were women able to gain new access to education in the long 19th century? What were the main results of this change?

Chapter 20: Redefinitions of Childhood

Regions. Even more than with gender, conditions for children differentiated strongly by region and social class. There was no common pattern of change. Increasing harshness for many children contrasted with new models of childhood that emerged most clearly, though not exclusively, in the Western middle class. In the long run, the period is probably most noteworthy for the new Western standards, that would ultimately gain more global applicability. A real redefinition was involved. But for more children, the period was marked by a combination of older traditions plus new disruptions caused by pressures on work and on families.

Child Labor. Children had always been expected to work in agricultural societies. For some, this might be combined with some education, but only elite children really were expected to focus on schooling alone. In most regions this mixture did not fundamentally change during the long 19th century. However, reliance on child labor, or harder child labor, might increase in areas that tried to respond to the growing demand for goods amid strong population growth. This applied to some early industrial situations, though particularly in Britain where the search for cheap factory labor was particularly strong. Children were widely put to work in the mines, for example hauling coal to the surface, and in textile factories. During a good half of the long 19th century, many children were also affected by pressures to ramp up productivity among slaves. Problems might begin when children were seized for the slave trade in Africa, until its abolition, typically separated not only from parents but also siblings; as one African put it, reflecting on his own capture in 1756, this “added fresh horrors even to the wretchedness of slavery.” Many slave children were whipped in the interests of promoting a faster pace.

Family Disruptions. Children in many regions might also be affected by new levels of family disruption. Population pressures on the land might prompt many adolescents to leave home, seeking work in the cities or through emigration abroad. Rates of illegitimate births went up – in the West in the later 18th century, in Russia in the later 19th, as looser community supervision and transient labor created new opportunities for casual unions. High rates of illegitimacy were a particular issue in Latin America, initially as a result of informal unions between European conquerors (male) and local women. But the trend continued in the 19th century. In some regions of Latin America, illegitimacy rates between 25 and 50% of all births were not uncommon. The results did not necessarily deprive children of adult supervision. Some fathers paid attention. Arrangements to place children with other families were not uncommon; in one Chilean city in 1880, 17% of all children lived in homes with adults who were not their parents. In many places also, orphanages expanded, not only to handle children whose parents died but also to serve as at least temporary option when parents felt they could not adequately support or care for their offspring.

New Laws. A first clear move into a more dramatic transformation of childhood involved laws regulating child labor – often forbidding any kind of work before age 8, limiting hours at least until age 12, frequently in principle requiring schooling as well. Laws of this sort, because they were novel, occasioned fierce debate. Many employers argued they needed the cheap hands of children. Many parents resented interference with the family economy. Gradually, however, all parties agreed that some limits on exploitation of children were essential for the social good as well as the wellbeing of children themselves. With time, laws extended protections, hitting other categories of children besides factory workers, limiting hours for older age groups; and enforcement improved. Child labor did not yet end: many children, or their parents, found ways around the laws through more casual urban employment (jobs as newspaper hawkers, message deliverers). But the principle of regulation was well established in the West by the later 19th century. Other societies, eager to avoid the worst exploitation, passed laws even before industrialization began, as in Russia by the mid-19th century. The traditional association of children with work, not yet displaced, was clearly being challenged. And in the urban middle classes, facing less economic pressure and more convinced of the essential value of education, the conversion was already complete: children did not work, they went to school. And as we have seen, this whole process brought the state into more direct contact with childhood than ever before.

New Family Arrangements. Several adjustments at the family level could also deeply affect childhood. Families in many industrial societies began to cut their birth rates, beginning again with the urban middle class. Not working, facing some expenses for schooling, children converted from being economic assets to liabilities, and this gradually compelled new decisions about how many children to seek. Having fewer children had several potential consequences for children themselves: they might receive more parental, or at least maternal, attention. They had fewer siblings for interaction, and this might push them toward greater reliance on more age-graded relationships with schoolmates. At the same time, infant death rates began to drop, reaching historic lows in the West by the early

20th century. With children less likely to die, parental commitment to young children might go up; and the emotional experience of childhood would certainly change when there were fewer occasions for grief.

Other Adjustments. Changes in childhood had wider ramifications. Where incomes permitted, parents began to buy more items for their children, who gradually became a consumer market. Books specifically for children began to be available in the West by the later 18th century. By the late 19th, children might buy other items directly; the practice of giving children allowances began, in the United States, in the 1890s. By this point, in the West, an interest in buying dolls even for infants began to spread. Germany produced stuffed bears for children, and the United States responded by introducing the teddy bear, named for a recent president. A new conception of adolescence gained ground. With some children now going to secondary school, a gap between early childhood and full adult earning capacity opened; new concerns about children's sexuality contributed as well (including, for a time, intense anxiety about masturbation). The idea of adolescence was a response. At the societal level, new attention to the special conditions of children contributed to the emergence of special policies for young criminals – juvenile delinquents – who must be separated from adults.

Geography. While the most sweeping changes in ideas and practices about children occurred in the West, often in dramatic contrast to conditions for children in other regions, -- complete with beliefs that children were loving innocents who contributed to the family's happiness emotionally rather than economically -- there was some geographical spillover, and of course this would increase after 1914. Japan was the most obvious case in point, even though the Japanese worked hard to emphasize distinctive educational values for children. The spread of schooling, new public health measures that reduced the infant death rate, and some regulation of child labor all prompted more explicit thinking about childhood itself. One historian has argued that this identification of childhood as an important concern was a new element in Japanese culture. Certainly other responses, including the government pamphlets designed to tell people how best to raise children and the adoption of the concept of juvenile delinquency, were significant developments in their own right. In Latin America middle-class observers, deeply concerned about what they thought they saw in the lower classes amid high rates of illegitimacy, similarly sought to encourage schooling and greater family stability. As one commentator put it, having two-parent families was essential to raise children who are "more educated, more deferential, and apply themselves to work."

Variety. The variety of children's conditions and the different possibilities for change obviously set up key issues for the future. The conversion of childhood from work to education, still incomplete even today, was just getting underway. Other questions about family values and their relationship to wider cultural concerns, including religious standards, were just beginning to emerge, though it was already clear in many regions that religion and family traditionalism, including relatively high birth rates, went hand in hand. Thanks to new ideas and new economic conditions, the long 19th century did toss up an important set of questions about children, along with contradictory trends in daily life.

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Discussion

How did ideas about children and childhood change during the long 19th century? What explains the changes in ideas?

Which were more important, ideas or economics, in causing changes in childhood?

What drove the expansion of consumer culture into childhood? What social groups participated in this consumerism?

How did Japan adapt Western practices concerning children?

Section V: Biological Changes

The long 19th century was not as rich a period, in terms of changes in the biological framework for human life, as the one that had preceded. There were no developments as massive as the Columbian exchange of foods, diseases and peoples. But some interesting population dynamics emerged, around overall growth – in some cases, very rapid growth – but also a Western demographic transition that had its own dramatic implications. The period also saw massive flows of migrants, with a number of innovations based on a combination of rising population pressures, new or perceived opportunity in some of the regions that offered open spaces or urban industry or both, and new transportation systems. There were some novel twists as well in other fundamental biological patterns, around disease and foodstuffs.

Chapters under this heading relate closely, of course, to the kinds of social developments discussed in the previous section. Rising urbanization, for example, created new opportunities for epidemic disease, but these were partly countered not only by the public health measures of leading cities but also by new applications of science and organization. New ideas about children showed up as both causes and effects of new birth control efforts.

Differentiations in the biological trends should be familiar by this point as well. Class and gender differences caused significant biological variations. In the West, working-class people were notably shorter, on average, than those in the middle class, because of lower standard of living and particularly food options. In many worker families, women sacrificed their full access to food in favor of making sure that the men – the “breadwinners” – had enough to fuel their efforts in the factories and mines; as a result, height differences between the genders were more marked than they are today, and this had some interesting implications concerning other aspects of gender roles.

Regional variations were greater still. Though this was not a new development, some regions, obviously, were senders of migrants, others were receivers; this distinction was quite sharp. The Western demographic transition was at this point quite unique; even Japan and Russia did not begin to enter in fully. Later, in the 20th century, the pattern would have more global applicability, but this was not the case before 1914. Populations structures, as a result, began to divide markedly between industrialized and non-industrialized categories. Disease of course was a potential unifier, as it could spread across other human boundaries; but this characteristic began to change somewhat as well, thanks to tighter border controls. Biological experiences continued to unite the human species in some respects, but variabilities were great and growing as well.

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The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. By Kenneth Pomeranz (Princeton University Press, 2001). Pages 69-85, 209-273.

Section V: Discussion Questions

What were the main similarities and differences between Western population patterns and those of other world regions during the long 19th century?

Compare the roles of public health programs and therapeutic medicine in 18th century population trends.

Why and how did Asia replace Africa as a major source of labor migrations during the 19th century?

Discuss the main features of the long 19th century in the history of epidemic disease.

To what extent did governments affect major demographic and migration trends during the long 19th century?

Chapter 21: Population Growth and the First Demographic Transition

More People; Lots More. The most important single point is essentially global: almost everywhere, population growth occurred, often at unprecedented rates. The overall global growth, at over 110% during the period, was probably the highest ever; it would be surpassed in the 20th century, but the long 19th century helped prepare even this greater gain by generating more people and therefore more potential parents. Western Europe, which began to grow very rapidly after 1730, saw its population nearly triple; Russia actually quadrupled. Asian populations almost doubled. African rates were lower, at 10%, but rapid by any prior standard. American populations, both North and South, soared, through a combination of natural increase and massive immigration. Only Pacific Oceania fell back, as new international contacts brought diseases for which there was no established resistance – the same pattern that had decimated the Americas during the Columbian exchange. But even here populations recovered and began to grow vigorously after 1850.

Causes. Causes are less certain here than results. A key factor was improved food supply. European (including Russian) growth owed much to the potato. This was a New World crop that began to be cultivated extensively in Europe only after the 1680s; previously, people had hesitated at the novelty of the crop, and the fact that it was not mentioned in the Bible rendered it suspect. But potatoes provided unprecedented calories per acre, and could be grown in relatively poor soil; only in the 19th century did diseases periodically affect the crop, causing new regional famines. Better food distribution helped as well: particularly by the later 19th century food could be shipped quickly and in bulk, and in the Western world famines actually ended except for wartime hardship. New lands were put under cultivation as well, particularly as agriculture spread in the Americas; food exports added to world supply. The application of science to agriculture generated more productive seeds and fertilizers. On the disease side we have seen that public health measures contributed to better conditions in many cities, though particularly after 1850, while border controls, particularly between the Middle East and Western Europe, disrupted the traditional path of epidemics. Finally, in the Americas, the earlier results of killer diseases brought in by Europeans and Africans had simply played themselves out; those who would die had died, and the remaining population had established immunities so that the death rate retreated markedly by the 18th century. Overall: more food, less death meant more people surviving, a numerical gain in itself and a source of more parents. There is no reason to believe that actual birth rates per capita went up: changes in death rates and the parent supply did the trick.

Asian Patterns. In China, population growth built in part on earlier increases that had resulted from better rice farming and the adoption of some New World crops as early as the 16th century. Japan was a different case, for population had long been stable. But the reform period of the 1860s included new encouragements to the intense cultivation of rice, and also a new focus on agricultural research in the universities. Japan was also quick to adopt the urban public health measures introduced in Western cities. Child death rates began to drop. The result was rapid growth for many decades, which helped spur Japanese industrialization and also imperialism. Overall, the levels of Asian growth posed clear economic and family problems, though Japan escaped the full brunt thanks to the fact it had not experienced a previous buildup and had industrialization as an outlet for many workers. Population growth pressed the available supply of land. The expense of dealing with population growth probably contributed to the sluggishness of Chinese responses to new threats during the period, and it certainly caused massive poverty and social unrest.

The Demographic Transition. Western reactions were different, beginning toward the end of the 18th century, partly of course because population pressures were even greater and more novel than in China. Gradually, more and more families began to cut their birth rates, from the traditional 6-8 children per family on average, to the 2-3 that were beginning to become common by the early 20th century. Even with industrialization, families simply could not handle the customary levels, and the gradual transition of childhood from work to schooling exacerbated the problem. Somewhat ironically, birth rate reduction ultimately spurred even greater efforts to reduce the traditional infant death rates: with fewer children, many families were motivated to want to preserve the ones they had. And governments, often worried about declining population growth, wanted to assure labor supply and the sources of troops. New efforts went into improving maternal and infant health; discovery of germs, and resultant improvements in sanitation, played a big role here, as did the overall enhancement of living standards as industrialization matured. Between 1880 and 1920, throughout Western Europe, North America, New Zealand and Australia, infant mortality dropped to unprecedented lows: from 20% of all children born dead before age 2, by 1920 the figure would be 5% or below. This, by the early 20th century, was the *demographic transition*: low birth rates and low infant death rates. The combination continued to slow overall population growth, but it also changed the characteristic age structure,

from populations that were almost 50% composed of children (some of whom would die), to populations now increasingly favoring adult sectors.

Differentiations . The demographic transition was a huge change, that would ultimately affect other parts of the world. (Though elsewhere the transition more commonly began with lower infant death rates, with birth rate responses coming later, the reverse of the Western pattern.) The transition in the Western world harbored many complexities. Middle classes everywhere, and also independent farmers in North America, introduced low birth rates first, realizing that they could only educate and establish children properly if they had fewer of them. Urban workers followed but at some lag, for some of the same reasons but also because of the sheer difficulty of city life, including limited housing. Peasants came last. Religious groups or regions changed more slowly than their more secular counterparts. Everywhere, education of girls played a key role. But social differentiations continued to have impact: in contrast to agricultural societies, where poorer groups usually had lower birth rates than the more wealth, with the demographic transition the poor maintained higher birth rates.

Experiences. The demographic transition could be difficult. Reliable birth control devices were not readily available until the vulcanization of rubber around 1840, and even then moralists tried to prevent their use on grounds that they would encourage rampant sexuality. Accepting sex as recreational rather than procreational took some time. As a result, many families had to rely on long periods of sexual abstinence, which could take its own toll. For potential parents, adjusting to a smaller number of children could challenge traditional standards of both masculinity and femininity. As childhood was redefined toward more emphasis on emotional rewards, and certainly as the burden of infant death was removed for most families for the first time in the human experience, adjustments may have eased.

Variance. In the world of 1900, the sharp differences in regional patterns were beginning to become more noticeable. European growth rates, except for the south and east, were now dipping well below international averages. The Asian and now the Latin American components were rising. The new population balances created additional changes, most obviously in migration patterns. Over time, they would also set a framework for other aspects of world history.

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Discussion

What was Malthusian theory, what explains why it made sense at the time?

How did agricultural change lead to population growth and new migration patterns in Europe?

Using Brazil as example, discuss the impact of export commodity production on population.

Why was the West the first region to experience the demographic transition? Why and how did changes in birth rate precede major changes in infant death rate in the West?

Chapter 22: Immigration

Numbers. Emigrants poured across the oceans during the long 19th century. The tide was greatest after midcentury, when transportation improvements kicked in, though even before this the slave trade and some transatlantic movement were relevant; and some French Canadians began to move into the United States. By 1914 17 million people had emigrated from Britain and Ireland, 4 million from Austria-Hungary, 2.5 million from Russia, and 10 million from Italy. One-third of the world's Jews moved, from both central and eastern Europe. Asian numbers were lower, but considerable. During the 1890s for example, 190,000 Indians moved outside Asia, often on indenture contracts to the Caribbean. There was also substantial Indian movement into east and southern Africa. During the same decade 290,000 Japanese emigrated, despite a strong cultural bias against departure. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese left as well, and by 1922 8 million Chinese were living abroad – mostly in southeast Asia but with considerable numbers in North America (plus Hawaii), Canada, and the Pacific coast of Latin America; some thousands even went to Cuba on indentured contracts.

Regions. Obviously, sending regions involved older agricultural societies faced with rising population pressure. The Middle East did not participate as substantially as did some other places, though there were smaller movements to the Americas and, as traders, into sub-Saharan Africa. Africa stopped sending people out after the Atlantic slave trade ended, except for a continuing trickle along the even older slave route into the Middle East. But virtually every other part of the world joined in, either as senders or receivers. Receiving regions were mainly the settler societies and some parts of Latin America, where relatively abundant land beckoned but also, increasingly, rapidly growing cities. But new Asian movements into southeast Asia and Africa deserve attention as well. This was a period of massive uprooting.

Causes. While there is no mystery about the broad causes of this surge, some details warrant attention. People were pushed out because of population pressure sparked by periodic famines, like the Irish potato famine of 1846-7. They might be prodded as well by religious or ethnic discrimination, like the Russian Jews who faced growing persecution in the later 19th century. But there were pull factors as well. Some may have been positively drawn to new places by ambitions coupled with dazzling stories about American streets paved with gold. Some were directly recruited, for example by United States railroad and heavy industry companies that sent agents to China or eastern Europe. Historians continue to debate various issues around motivation, and of course there was surely great variety involved. Some migrants were very poor and uneducated, ready at most for unskilled labor. But some Europeans moved from artisanal or other ranks that were a bit higher up, where ambition for further improvement, and not sheer pressure, factored in. Were migrants, from whatever starting point, unusually venturesome and entrepreneurial? Did they leave a corresponding void in the older societies they abandoned? Probably this would be a stretch, but the migrants were not necessarily simply a random sample.

Experiences. The immigration experience could be difficult. Many immigrant groups managed to stick together. Clusters of Germans and Scandinavians set up coherent farming communities in the United States Midwest. German groups established ethnic organizations in Latin American cities. Later, when immigration more commonly targeted cities, residential ethnic communities grew up, again providing mutual support. Immigrants to Latin America from Spain and Italy may have had fewer adjustment problems than their counterparts in North America, because of language and religious affinities. In the United States, strong forces of integration or what began to be called “Americanization”, including the school system, called for rapid adjustments, and these could be difficult; often the children of immigrants spent much of their life bridging between their parents and the new environment. And strategies varied. Jewish immigrants quickly cut their birth rate, advised by middle-class Jews who had come before; Italians and east Europeans would make the move more slowly. Italian immigrants in the United States tried to keep family members working together, opposing for example any move by women to take domestic service jobs in native-born households; but Poles provided many domestics.

Racism. In many places, particularly given the growing diversity and distance of immigrant origins, immigrants faced massive racial prejudice. Increasing racist beliefs, around social interpretations or misinterpretations of Darwinism, held that southern Europeans, for example, were inferior to northern stock. Other beliefs about immigrant criminality were widespread. Asian immigrants faced particular prejudices, including legal measures to block their further flow. The fact that a disproportionate number of Asian immigrants were male gave rise to a number of issues around sexuality and involvement in urban red light districts.

Returns

A new feature of immigration in this period, particularly as steam shipping took hold, involved massive returns back home. A large minority of Italians and eastern Europeans who came to the United States did not like it there, and went back (few Jews did, however). But this could have an effect on the sending societies, for the returnees often brought some new habits, and snobbery, with them. In a different pattern of return. Asian immigrants in the United States worked hard to send the bodies of family members back home for burial, reflecting intense cultural attachment to the original native land even when they themselves did not leave.

Impacts. Immigration was both an economic and a cultural experience. It was vital to the rapid development of North America and Australia, providing the labor force that, for example, built the canals and railroads; but also some special skills that would show up in construction or factory work. The importance of Italian stonemasons in the architecture of late-19th-century American cities was a case in point; the (sometimes resented) role of Indian merchants in Africa was another. Emigration was also vital in reducing tensions in home countries, by cutting population pressure. But migrations also spread cultural contacts of various sorts. United States Catholicism was deeply affected by the various ethnic versions of Catholicism, that sometimes coexisted uneasily. Many immigrants balanced loyalties to their new land – they were often proud of citing or exaggerating their accomplishments in letters back home, seeking to justify their decision to leave. But they also retained a sense of separateness and identity, sometimes becoming more nationalist – as Irish Americans or Italian Americans – than many people were in their countries of origin. The new mixtures were complex.

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Discussion

What were the main changes in the nature of immigration by the later 19th century?

What were the main causes of immigration? What are the main debates about immigrants' motivations in this period?

How did immigrants retain their ethnic identities? In what ways did they affect host countries? How did they accept cultural forms in their host countries?

How did migration affect overall economic development in these countries?

In what regions did concerns about race limit immigration? Were there regions race played a part in encouraging immigration?

Compare the United States and Latin America as immigrant-receiving societies in the later 19th century.

Chapter 23: Foods and Diseases

Basic Foods. The globalization of foodstuffs had occurred earlier; most regions were now familiar with the same range of plants and animals, though of course regional conditions and tastes varied. Probably the greatest change in this category was simply the spread of domesticated animals – particularly sheep – through Australia and New Zealand, where they significantly altered the environment; and through the west of North America, where cattle were also involved. The long 19th century also saw growing international interest in the native American tomato. Previously widely feared as poisonous – and indeed, served on lead plates, its acids could promote lead poisoning, interest in the “love apple” now spread widely. It was widely incorporated into Italian cuisine during this period, including pizza. These developments rounded out the internationalization of food types.

Transportation and More Commercial Agriculture. The bigger news in this period was the growing capacity to export large amounts of basic foods to major cities, and particularly the industrial centers of Western Europe. Already in the late 18th century grain exports from Poland and Russia began to increase. The construction of the Erie Canal, in the United States, was designed to facilitate agricultural exports as well as service to east coast cities. Far greater possibilities developed in the 1860s and 1860s. Shipping capacity greatly increased, allowing massive grain exports from North America and Argentina. The introduction of canning expanded the range of foods that could be sent overseas. Refrigerated shipping, from the 1870s onward, allowed the export of meats, a huge boon for the economies of the United States, Argentina, Canada, and Australia. Increasingly, agricultural exports came from societies that applied considerable mechanization to farming, thus allowing relatively low labor costs without uniformly low wages. This kind of commercial agriculture put growing pressure on peasant farmers in Europe, though tariff protections were constructed in response. But countries like Britain began to depend on food imports, finding greater profit in the growing focus on the urban economy.

More Global Tastes. Far less important than the new global movement of foods was the corresponding emergence of new options in cuisine. Both consumerism and immigration contributed to new eating options – though most people, everywhere, still defined their tastes more traditionally. In the United States, French-style restaurants began to be established from the 1840s onward, defining fine dining for members of the urban upper class. Chinese restaurants emerged in many places – despite racial prejudices. In the United States Chinese restaurants first served immigrant workers in railroad construction in the west. But they proved popular with some other groups as well, once Chinese styles were partly Americanized into blander dishes like chop suey. Somewhat more slowly, the popularity of pizza began to gain ground, from the 1880s onward. These were early stages in a process that would later accelerate.

Contagious Diseases. Disease constituted the final, and familiar, aspect of biological history during the long 19th century. Not surprisingly, contagious diseases spread frequently, now embracing the Americas thanks to regular transatlantic shipping. But they surged less rapidly than might have been expected given the growing levels of international contact. Cholera was a crucial problem, as interactions with India and the Middle East accelerated. Major epidemics occurred in Western Europe and North and Central America from the early 1830s through the 1870s. Contacts from Africa to the Caribbean brought episodes of yellow fever, from which it spread to east coast cities in the United States and Brazil. Influenza began to cross boundaries as well, setting the stage for the huge epidemic of 1918-9.

Countermeasures. Scientific research helped attack the disease framework. Work on cholera identified transmission mechanisms and soon after 1900 led to new cures. Urban sanitation, through the sewer systems and water treatment plants, played an even greater role in reducing the spread of disease. Control of rodents in the cities, though imperfect, supported this effort as well. By 1900 cholera and bubonic plague were largely eliminated, at least outside Asia. Under colonial administrations public health measures also spread to India and Africa, as a matter of enlightened self-interest for diplomatic and business communities. Efforts to reduce mosquito infestations gained growing momentum, for example in the construction of the Panama canal soon after 1900. An even more dramatic step, organizationally, involved more international efforts. Already in the 1830s Egyptian reform leader Muhammad Ali had introduced the practice of quarantining ships’ passengers who might bring cholera with them. An initial conference on international quarantining occurred in Paris in 1851, and meetings took place regularly thereafter. Much wrangling involved European claims that their superior society should regulate disease carriers from lesser civilizations, with much attention to the role of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. But the idea of international hygiene standards and disease control did gain ground, with Russia and the Ottoman Empire also involved.

Changes in Disease. In the West, thanks in part to the greater control of plagues, a fairly dramatic new disease pattern was clearly emerging by 1900, even in advance of major improvements in therapeutic medicine; key agents were the gains in public health and general living standards. While epidemic diseases did not disappear, they, along with infant gastrointestinal ailments, began to decline rapidly, leading to greater adult longevity as well as the demographic transition. With this change, in turn, attention to degenerative diseases, particularly cancer, heart disease and strokes, began to increase, a major shift in the traditional priorities. New life insurance companies, even in advance of much medical research, began to urge weight control to prolong life expectancy in these new conditions. Along with this came some additional focus on psychological disorders; concern about neurasthenia, an early version of what today we call stress, spread widely during the final decades of the period, for example. Again, this transformation was, at this point, a Western phenomenon; the health gap with the rest of the world was considerable, as in so many other areas. But, as we have seen, interest in and potential for controlling some diseases was not just a regional issue, and further global changes would occur in the contemporary period.

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Discussion

What were the most important food exchanges during the long 19th century?

What were the main responses to disease in 19th century world history? Were diseases more or less significant than during the 15th-17th centuries?

What role did technology developments have in shaping consumer food tastes? Did cultural preference prevent any food adoptions despite increased availability or lower price?

How did imperialism impact the spread of foods and culinary culture in the 19th century? How did reverse flow of culture and food commodities impact colonial metropolises?

What caused cholera to become a significant world threat in the long 19th century? How did governments respond in order to control it?

How did public health measures operate across different cultures? How did they reflect the different power dynamics in the major world regions?

Where and how did cities begin to change their historic pattern as disproportionate centers of disease during the long 19th century?

Section VI: Cultural Developments

Regional cultures continued to vary greatly during the long 19th century. Many regions had to react to some aspects of Western culture, given heightened trade and the burst of imperialism, but the interactions were not necessarily very far-reaching at this point, and there were important countertrends. At the level of high culture – the arts and science – several areas did join Western Europe in some shared contributions: thus Russia generated important scientific discoveries, North Americans eagerly turned to Europe for advances in science, and Russia and the Americas alike participated in common developments in the arts and literature. Given the influence of Western cities, architectural styles spread even more widely, as in the development of the Bund section of Shanghai or the new buildings going up in Istanbul (Constantinople) at the end of the century.

For the most part, however, regional patterns reflected differentiations that had been established in earlier periods, as with the predominance of Hinduism in India, the central role of Islam in the Middle East, the continued impact of the Enlightenment in Western Europe. Change occurred, but again on a strongly regional basis. It would be misleading to try to identify a dominant global trend.

Cultural patterns were also confused by some new clashes and diversities. Most obviously, the clear gains of science, in terms of achievements and geography alike, were complicated by important religious energies in many places. This was a great period for missionary activity, Christian but also Islamic. Key changes within religion included a significant movement claiming to purify Islam, new kinds of adjustments in Judaism, and bitter debates within Western Christianity about how best to adapt to the modern world. At the same time, somewhat separately, leading artists particularly in the West had to discuss their own reactions to the rise of science and industrial society, generating unprecedented stylistic innovations and challenging public perceptions of artistic standards.

The cultural map of the period thus includes both traditional and novel regional patterns, which did not dovetail with some of the other divisions in the period, such as economic and political trends. It includes change, but of various and sometimes directly discordant types, along with a clear interest in retaining older cultural identities. International connections expanded, but without creating common trajectories, much less a common cultural framework.

Basic Treatments (pick at least one):

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Section VI: Discussion Questions

What factors best explain the surge of missionary activity during the 19th century?

Why did external religions have influence in Africa than modern science did?

Compare Confucian and Islamic reactions to modern science.

Discuss the long 19th century as the beginning of global styles in the arts.

Is it valid to see the long 19th century as the beginning of cultural globalization? What would the main objections be to this argument?

How did Russia interact culturally with the West during the long 19th century?

Chapter 24: Science

Basics. Nothing as fundamental as the earlier Western scientific revolution occurred during the long 19th century. Within the West, new scientific discoveries were matched by new institutions designed to carry science further and apply it more intentionally to areas like technology and medicine. But the geographical expansion of science was also a key development. Russian leaders had been interested in Western science before, but their involvement now deepened. North America, though not yet a major player in terms of basic research, developed its own infrastructure in active connection with Europe. Japan turned explicit to a commitment to science as well, a crucial modification of this regional culture. On these bases something of an international scientific community began to take shape, though with clear leadership from Western Europe. But it is also important to note that a number of regions largely stayed apart from the scientific enthusiasms of the period.

The Infrastructure. Previously, Western scientific advance had depended on a combination of individual researchers and the larger support of the many scientific societies that had emerged from the 17th century onward. These persisted, but two other institutional innovations expanded the base. First, beginning in Germany, major universities began to commit to significant scientific research. Some of this was applied work, as in the growing interest in focusing science on agriculture and medicine; but basic science emerged from the research universities as well. Second, though particularly toward the end of the period, major corporations began to develop research efforts, as in the German chemical industry. Here the interest in application was paramount, but the development obviously expanded both the apparatus and the impact of many branches of science.

New Discoveries and Uses. New discoveries marked virtually all the major scientific disciplines during this period. Major gains occurred in physics, for example in exploring electricity and electromagnetism. Astronomy advanced, aided by more powerful telescopes. Advances in medical research included the germ theory, developed by Louis Pasteur in France, and also new technologies such as the X-ray machine. While major medical therapies did not change greatly, there were huge gains in diagnosis and pathology. And the introduction of anesthetics constituted a huge step in surgery and obstetrics; one British mother named her child Anesthesia in gratitude. But the most important single development came in biology and geology, with Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, that radically altered the chronology of the earth and the understanding of the emergence of the human species. Moves toward explaining the mechanisms of evolution involved explorations of genetic mutations, where research advanced rapidly at the end of the century. Scientific research, in sum, continued to show its potential for vital, challenging innovations and, increasingly, for application to human life.

Internationalization. Fueled by growing confidence in science, a number of international associations now grouped scientists around the world, though based on Western initiative. Particularly interesting was the emergence of agreements to monitor the weather worldwide, in an International Meteorological Association, providing unprecedented opportunities for data collection. Scientific groups also formed in areas such as statistics.

Russia. Russian scholars played a growing role in the advancement of science, participating actively with their Western colleagues despite the other characteristic that seemed to mark Russia off from the West. It was a Russian scientist, Pavlov, who discovered the phenomenon of conditioned reflexes with his famous salivating dogs, toward the end of the period. Russian advances in mathematics were also fundamental.

North America. North America was not yet a research leader, though American and Canadian advances in technology – as with the telephone and a variety of electrical equipment—had scientific overtones, and there was also important research in agriculture. Many American scholars studied eagerly in France and Germany, seeking to develop capacities in science and medicine. From Germany Americans also imported the research university at the end of the period, forming new institutions such as Johns Hopkins and Clark, that would soon provide models for established universities as well.

Japan. Japanese reforms included an explicit commitment to scientific education and research. Leaders like Fukuzawa Yukichi, who studied in the West, deliberately argued that Japanese Confucianism must be modified in two related respects: first, the disproportionate esteem for older knowledge must be reversed to favor new discoveries; and second, the substantial Confucian disinterest in science must be fundamentally altered. Japanese intellectuals worked on the whole to preserve Confucianism in other respects, notably in politics, but the scientific

breakthrough was a major change. Japanese scientists did not yet contribute basic innovations of their own, but the emphasis on science in the schools prepared further change.

Other Regions. Interest in reforms in other societies included growing awareness of science. This was a key theme among Chinese students who flocked to the West or Japan at the end of the century, though the interest was recent and tentative. British presence in India included important interactions with Indian science. But many regions remained somewhat apart from new scientific endeavor. The Middle East, despite proximity to Europe, was hesitant. There were few translations of Western work, except in medicine; indeed the Ottoman Empire only began to allow printing of any sort in the middle of the 18th century, fearing a challenge to religious orthodoxy. Only at the end of the period did some students, associated for example with the Young Turk movement, begin to expand their interest in scientific training. Africa also was not yet greatly affected by science, and Latin American intellectual interests ran more toward art and literature than to science, though of course there was some awareness of developments elsewhere.

Science and Culture. In the leading centers of scientific interest, science clearly became a more professional activity during the long 19th century, often involving formal educational degrees. At the same time, however, scientific discoveries were still widely popularized (and sometimes, as with Darwinism, distorted). They had clear impact on the way many relatively ordinary people thought about the world. This was why the continued innovations associated with science, including the idea that humans were descended from the apes through evolutionary processes, could be so exciting, or troubling. In all respects – the professional and the popular-cultural alike – science became a major factor in shaping outlook, in a growing number of regions.

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Discussion

- What were the most important changes in science during the long 19th century?
- What is meant by a culture of science?
- Did Western science become global in the 19th century? Or did a global science develop that was not uniquely Western?
- How did women participate in scientific inquiry? How did class status impact science and scientists?
- How did science operate differently in the colonial context?
- What were the most important regional factors affecting the development of science in the period?
- What was the relationship between industrialization and capitalism and the development of science? How did both affect the status of scientists?

Chapter 25: Religions

Dynamism. The long 19th century was a major period in the history of religions. Innovations sparked key developments in Islam. Christian missionary vigor contrasted somewhat ironically with the growing secularism of much Western – particularly West European – culture. Christians, and Jews, also faced key issues of adjustment to various modern trends, including science, and responses varied and clashed.

Islam: Wahabism. Slightly before the mid-18th century a movement called Wahabism emerged in the southern Arabian peninsula, calling for a purification of Islamic practice. Wahabi leaders objected to the veneration of Islamic saints and pilgrimages to shrines; they argued that theirs was the only pure version of the faith. They rejected others Muslims, sometimes violently, in their zeal to spread their own doctrines. Wahabi leaders formed an alliance with a regional religious leader who offered political protection. The alliance conquered a large territory, ultimately including Mecca, clashing with the Ottoman Empire. Early in the 20th century a new expansion essentially created the state of Saudi Arabia.

Islam: Missionary Outreach. Separately, but also in the later 18th century, a powerful missionary movement emerged in sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars like Usuman dan Fodio argued against the traditional policy of living peacefully with nonbelievers, and pressed for wider conversions. Several holy wars occurred in the Sudan region. Islam began to become a popular religious force throughout much of the northern part of the subcontinent. These developments in Islam had little to do with wider global forces, though Islam in Africa may have benefited from not being Western during the period of the slave trade and then imperialism. But they marked major new vigor in the religion, though they also created new conflicts with older versions.

Christianity. Many Western Christians quietly modified some traditional beliefs during the long 19th century. Many accepted some Enlightenment ideas, for example downplaying beliefs in original sin in favor of emphasis on the innocence and goodness of children. Accommodations with consumerism also occurred. In the United States a fascinating innovation, reflecting new ideas about the family, involved the notion that family members would unite in heaven. Mainstream Protestantism continued to command wide allegiance, and the long 19th century was a period of major churchbuilding, to keep pace with growing cities, as well as the missionary movement.

Protestant and Science. Some Protestants, however, took major exception to the challenge the idea of evolution posed to the Biblical account of God's creation. Their resistance was stiffened by aggressive efforts by some evolutionists to attack religion altogether. Major disputes were particularly marked in the United States, though Germans and others also participated. The issue was not fully resolved by 1914.

Catholics and Modernity. On the whole, Catholics had less difficulty with scientific ideas, for they had never depended so heavily on literal interpretations of the Bible. But modern politics were another matter: many church leaders, including key popes, attacked ideas like freedom of religion or secular education. Papal hostility to the creation of the Italian state was another key issue, for most of the old Papal States were folded into the new nation. Several popes issued bitter blasts at modern concepts, though there was also some sympathy for social reform. Quarrels around Catholicism marked not only Western Europe, but also Latin America.

Christian Missionaries. Catholics and Protestants alike sponsored vigorous missionary efforts in the period, often in association with imperialism. Many missionaries brought some modern political and medical ideas along with their religious efforts. On the whole Christians made little dent in the strongholds of Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism, though in China they did found a new series of universities and helped spark the movement against footbinding. But significant numbers of Koreans converted, possibly in part because Christianity was an alternative to Japanese influence; and there were many conversions as well in Vietnam. Africa, however, proved particularly receptive. With some help from colonial administrations – which however were rather cautious about religion – many Christian conversions occurred in parts of Nigeria, South Africa and elsewhere. With Christianity and Islam both gaining ground, sub-Saharan Africa was beginning a process of moving away from traditional polytheism by the early 20th century.

Judaism. Like Christianity, many Jews struggled with adjustments to modern conditions, including in many countries a new freedom of religion. Some retained the Orthodox faith; some turned to Zionist nationalism. But many Jews began to form new movements, like Reform Judaism, that sought to adjust Judaism to modern politics

and science. Jews in many countries also had to deal with a major resurgence of anti-Semitism that objected to the tolerance of Jews and the success that many Jews gained in business and the press.

New Amalgams. Several new religious movements marked the later 19th century. Particularly in Brazil, where Catholicism might sometimes combine with native American and African traditions but also new European ideas, several spiritist religions emerged that gained wide acceptance, sometimes alongside Catholicism itself. Another religion, the Bahai, gained ground initially in Persia, seeking to unify key elements of Islam, Christianity, Judaism but also Hinduism and Buddhism. None of these efforts was widely popular on an international scale, but they demonstrated the intensity of religious interest and some new attempts to mediate among some of the older faiths.

Impacts. The world religious map became no simpler during the long 19th century. New divisions added to old in Islam, and Christians and Jews were newly if sometimes informally split between reformers and traditionalists. Tolerance increased in some cases, but decreased in others. Religious vitality and complexity seemed to go hand in hand.

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Discussion

What tensions developed between religion and the state during the long 19th century? How did religions adapt to the growing power of the state?

In what ways did Islamic thought change in the long 19th century? How did these changes differ by region?

How did missionary activity differ in Africa and Asia?

How did Jewish practices change in Russia? What distinct groups formed and what historical changes contributed to their creation?

What were the major patterns in relations between religion and science during the long 19th century?

Chapter 26: The Arts

International Influences. As in science and religion there was no unifying artistic trend in the long 19th century. There were, however, some interesting and stimulating new interactions. Western artists benefited greatly from new knowledge of Japanese and African styles, which they folded into their own innovations. There was even some influence from Pacific Oceania. The interactions played a major role in generating new painting styles, such as impressionism. Architectural innovations also spilled across borders.

Technology. Technological changes had a major impact on the arts in this period, particularly of course in the West. Painters had to adjust to the rise of photography. On the whole, since photographs now captured literal representations, they tended to encourage the rise of new, more abstract styles. Artists of various sorts had to decide whether to offer alternatives to industrial ugliness – painting colorful scenes of nature, either in traditional styles or the newer impressionist mode – or whether to use art to convey movement and mechanical qualities, as in the Italian movement called Futurism. Technology had its greatest impact on architecture, not surprisingly. New building materials, including structural steel and poured concrete, and the invention of an effective elevator in 1853 created major new possibilities.

Modern vs. Conventional. In most artistic domains, in the West, huge conflicts broke out between self-styled innovators, who cast aside older conventions, and those who thought painting and music should continue to uphold traditional taste. Battles were fought in music, in literature – for example, with poets who avoided rhyme and meter in an effort they described as “art for art’s sake”, and in painting and sculpture. Innovation spread widely. But public tastes did not change so rapidly, and many modern artists gained little popularity at least in their own lifetimes. And throughout the long 19th century artists in many countries also tried to capture older popular artistic expressions. They collected folktales, they tried to revive the crafts in furniture. This was an important artistic reaction to modern conditions as well.

Architecture. Architecture in some ways saw the smallest amount of stylistic change in the period, because unlike painting or poetry architects have to have support from a paying public; their structures cannot otherwise be built. Most architecture in the period thus tried to revive older styles. There was a major neo-Gothic movement, and not just in church building. Byzantine styles gained some followers. But the big emphasis was on adaptations of classic Greek and Roman styles; a French version of this impulse in the later 19th century was dubbed the Beaux Arts style. On the other hand, the new technologies effected major change, regardless of style. And this, along with rising urban real estate prices, did generate the clearest architectural innovation: the skyscraper. Initial skyscrapers clustered in several American cities, including Chicago; imitations elsewhere would come more slowly.

Arts and Geography. Separate artistic traditions continued to describe Africa, East Asia, India and most of the Middle East. Western imperialists might construct buildings in their own styles, often totally ignoring local conditions as well as fashions, but there was little interaction with the main regional themes. To be sure, late in the 19th century some locals, as in the newest palaces in Istanbul, began adopting Beaux Arts models, but this was the only major exception. However, a growing number of regions began to participate in what can be called a broader Western artistic community. Latin American authors had their own themes, including native traditions and slavery, but they carefully followed European and United States styles and contributed to them in turn. The United States was not yet producing real artistic leaders, but artistic production began to go well beyond the primitives that had described the colonial period. Many American artists actually studied and worked abroad for a time, particularly in Paris. And both the United States and Latin America began to set up characteristic Western artistic institutions: museums, symphony orchestras, dance companies, in which European performers were frequently featured. Russia also joined this international high culture. Russian painters made little mark, but composers did, as Russia took second place only to Germany in the creation of “classical” music in this period. And Russian writers like Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky – again with their own themes, such as aristocratic life or the impact of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia – clearly contributed to a common canon, influenced by and influencing other literatures in Europe. Finally, both Russian tsars and American business tycoons provided vigorous patronage to Western, mainly European, artists, buying their works in volume.

The Place of the Arts. On the whole, particularly in Western high culture, the long 19th century was a good period for many artists, but also a challenging one. There were major new choices to be made about how much stylistic innovation to accept, how much traditionalism was necessary to play it safe. From the mid-18th century onward,

many artists began to be able to support themselves from sales to the public, rather than depending on noble patronage. Novelists, particularly, could earn good money. As in science, professionalism advanced. But the arts were also fickle, and many struggled to get their message across; the image of the “starving artist” and bohemian also dates from this period. Many collectors preferred safe “old masters” to contemporary stylistic innovators. The role of the arts in a modern, industrializing world was still a work in progress in 1914.

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Discussion

Discuss some of the artistic consequences of industrialization in the long 19th century.

Using Japanese and Russian examples, discuss the relationship of nationalism and art in the later 19th century.

What major historical themes did art forms of the 19th century represent? How did these themes differ by region?

How did Western audiences view Asian art? What role did the Japanese have in the construction of this idea of “Asia” through art?

Did 19th century art create greater social divisions, around acceptable styles and tastes, or did it reduce them?

Section VII: War, Peace, and Diplomacy

The long 19th century was dotted with major and minor wars. Several of the bloodiest conflicts in human history – in the top 30 of all time, though not in the top 10 save for World War I – occurred in the period. Two large clashes punctuated the period, which then ended with the third, the devastating world war itself. But there were also several intense regional struggles, as in southern Africa, the United States Civil War, the Crimea, and the unifications wars of Italy and Germany. And imperialism brought many battles, some of them surprisingly extensive for the native peoples involved, if not usually for the Western conquerors.

A long period of war, combined with industrialization, also saw major developments in military methods. New technology was crucial, in the nature and manufacture of guns but also in the scale and speed of troop transport. Navies were transformed, which was crucial to the increasingly global scale of conflict. Navies also provided the focus for the first clear arms race in world history, the competition between Britain and Germany particularly over the construction of battleships.

Military training and organization also became more precise, and the principles of modern military activity spread from Europe to other places, most obviously the United States and Japan. Military medicine was also revolutionized.

But the long 19th century was also a century of peace in key respects, which was why many Westerners around 1900 hailed the dawn of yet another new century with hopes that war itself might end. More new peace movements and peace ideas emerged than ever before; only early Buddhism and then early Christianity had been at all comparable. Enlightenment optimism extended to wide beliefs that human beings could overcome the impulse to military action. From another vantage point, many businessmen and economists agreed: war might be replaced. By the 1890s even sports organizers chimed in, as the revived Olympic games suggests that athletic competition might provide a peaceful substitute for battle.

The period also saw some progress toward peace in practice: the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 aimed explicitly at a durable settlement, and established some very effective principles toward that end. Later in the 19th century a number of other new international institutions aimed at peaceful resolution of conflicts. And a larger network of global organizations took shape that, while aimed at other targets, were consistent with commitments to a new kind of world order. Here were bases for the growing optimism about further gains for peace in the future.

The hopes proved false, of course, and the long 19th century ended in one of the world's most brutal wars, unprecedented in global scope and near the top of the charts in terms of devastation. Figuring out how diplomacy went so wrong is the final analytical task in rounding out the assessment of the world's first industrial age.

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Pages 279-300.

Section VII: Discussion Questions

Were optimistic observers wrong, around 1900, in arguing that peace had been more important than war in determining the character of the 19th century?

What was the impact of imperialist wars of conquest back home, in Europe or the United States? What was the impact on the regions directly involved?

Why was Latin America relatively free from major war after the independence movement ended?

Besides World War I itself, what factors most contributed to the end of the leading characteristics of the long 19th century?

Discuss the relationship of nationalism and globalization in the long 19th century

Chapter 27: Wars and Military Developments

Major wars in the period, from the Seven Years War to World War I, followed from the ambitions and rivalries of the European powers, with the United States and Japan joining at the end of the period. A few regional conflicts fell outside that focus (and there were also two bloody risings within China that must be counted in terms of sheer violence). But by 1850 imperialism tended to pull virtually all formal warfare into a European-dominated orbit. Few imperial conquests involved extensive struggles, for the European weapons advantage was too great for prolonged activity, but there were a few exceptions; and the cumulative effect of imperialist military rivalries, including battles against indigenous peoples in the settler societies, was considerable.

World War I, with 17 million deaths, and many additional casualties, ranks as the 8th bloodiest war in human history, by admittedly imprecise comparative standards. The Napoleonic Wars, between 1803 and 1815, which involved invasions or attempted invasions of virtually the whole continent plus periodic clashes with anti-Napoleonic alliances along with brief truce years, with 3.5 million casualties, comes in at #14. The Seven Years War, 1756-1763, that pitted France against Britain on a worldwide basis plus a clash between Austria and Prussia in Europe itself, killed between 870,000 and 1.4 million, stands at #26. But there was also a separate regional war in southern Africa, 1816-1828, as an upstart ruler named Shaka briefly unified a new Zulu kingdom, caused 2 million deaths. The United States Civil War, the most destructive in the nation's history, killed 2% of the population. The Franco-Prussia war, 1870-1, that completed the unification of Germany, cost about 200,000 military casualties, with wider impact on civilians. The Crimean War, 1854-5, where Britain and France joined the Ottoman Empire in resisting Russian territorial gains, caused another 200,000 deaths among troops. There is little doubt, on a global scale, that even aside from outright imperialism and the Chinese civil strife, the first industrial age was the most deadly to date.

Casualty rates soared in part of course because of overall population gains; there were simply more people at stake, more latitude for high casualty levels. The fact that several major wars spilled over into a number of different centers – India and North America as well as Europe in the Seven Years War, for example, also explains higher death rates. The devastation also resulted from the growing capacity of European governments, from the French Revolution onward, to recruit and maintain larger standing armies.

But the key change involved technology. As early as the French Revolution and Napoleon, more mobile field artillery affected land-based clashes; Napoleon himself was a master tactician here. Then, with fuller industrialization, the principle of interchangeable parts, massively accelerated the sheer production of guns, which no longer had to be individually crafted. Invention of the repeating rifle and then early versions of the machine gun increased the capacity of infantrymen to kill. Finally, trains and steamships revolutionized the scale and speed of troop transport, as the Crimean and American Civil wars demonstrated shortly after mid-century.

(The Zulu wars around Shaka's political ambitions had nothing to do with European technologies, which the ruler himself judged inferior. But Shaka introduced short spears, which proved highly effective against the more traditional long, thrown spears of his opponents, which were far less accurate. The Zulu state that resulted proved vulnerable however to increasing British colonial pressure, which Shaka himself, admitting some early colonists, had simply not foreseen in his conviction that the foreign military and economic tactics would not prove successful.)

Naval warfare was itself transformed by the replacement of sail with steam, wood with steel. The later 19th century saw the emergence of giant battleships, and an explicit arms race as Germany tried to catch up with British levels, from 1891 onward, while Britain insisted on a wide advantage. Steamships also changed river wars, as European gunships could sail upstream in Africa and China.

Deaths and maimings prompted some response. A Swiss observer of the Italian-Austrian conflict that led to Italian unification, appalled at the suffering, began the agitation that led to the first Geneva conventions (1864), to established criteria for the medical care of military personnel from all sides in a war; many countries signed on. The Crimean Wars saw greater deployment of nurses, including the famous Florence Nightingale. Surgery advanced in the United States Civil War, though use of anesthetics was just coming into play.

The organization of war involved, finally, clearer principles of military organization and more specialized officer training. Napoleon himself was a talented general who never would have made it into top rank had older principles of aristocratic preferment not been set aside by the French Revolution. Many new military training academies were established in the period, with heavy emphasis on engineering as well as strategy. Even in peacetime, formal strategic planning advanced to new levels. This kind of preparation would clearly come into play in World War I, as major combatants had very clear playbooks, though the same development also reduced the flexibilities that might have led to quicker compromise among opponents.

Finally, warfare in the long 19th century involved imperialism, including the push by small armies in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand against native warriors. Imperialist gains did not always involve military

action; they also benefited from negotiations and alliances with local leaders. And European audiences, less concerned about deaths among “natives”, hardly counted the battles that did occur as wars at all. But outright fighting, along with civilian deaths from disease and famine, could take a fearful toll. Well over two million people, almost entirely African, died in the Belgian conquest of the Congo. British attacks against a local revolt in Sudan led to hundreds of thousands of African troops mowed down by machine guns. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, fought over Japanese interest in controlling Korea, was less disastrous, with 35,000 casualties, but this too demonstrated the power of a modern military over a more populous society that had simply not kept up with the new methods of warfare. United States victory over Spain, in the same period, had similar overtones.

Overall, many aspects of the long 19th century were defined by military action and military change, particularly as warfare interaction with industrial economies. The results showed recurrently, in several key general and regional wars, several of which generated startling casualty rates. They showed up as well in the pronounced mismatch between European and non-European combatants, with the United States and Japan joining the modern ranks by the end of the period. Only a few major setbacks, like the Italian defeat in Ethiopia or the difficulties Britain had in putting down Afrikaaner (Dutch origin) settlers in the South African Boer War (1899-1902) marred the record. The long 19th century would end with the heavily-armed European powers facing each other directly, with disastrous results.

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Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention. By Carolyn Hamilton (Harvard University Press, 1998).

Discussion

What was the role of naval power in the 19th century? What were the most important changes involved?

Compare the wars of the 18th century to the Napoleonic wars. What were the main changes?

What is the place of Zulu warfare in 19th century military history?

What features of the Western military would an aspiring nation like Japan, in the later 19th century, be particularly eager to imitate?

What were the most important developments in the military position of the West in the world, from 1750 to 1914?

Chapter 28: New Movements toward Peace

New Ideas. Interest in peace was a key part of the European Enlightenment. Voltaire, for example, seeking religious tolerance, believed that a peace based on the end of fanaticism was “far from a dream.” From another vantage point the new breed of liberal economists, headed by Adam Smith, argued that growing international trade would make war obsolete, “by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests that are in opposition to it.” Lawyers began to discuss principles in international law that could reduce conflict. The most powerful statement came from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his 1795 book on *Perpetual Peace*. Kant argued that the abolition of war was the highest moral imperative, he urged a new confederation of states that would resolve conflict in future.

Diplomatic Moves. During the later 18th century several European governments actually worked on new methods of arbitration that would reduce tension. The focus was particularly on maritime disputes, and indeed several conflicts – between Britain and Sweden, or later Britain and the new United States – did yield to diplomacy. The most important concrete step, however, was the Treaty of Vienna that ended the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The great European powers met to establish a durable peace. They unduly ignored liberal and nationalist sentiments, hoping in vain for a return to monarchical conservatism. But they did avoid excessive punishment of France, including this nation in a new balance of European power. The great age of French aggression did in fact come to a close, and the larger results of mutual discussion and power balance helped prevent another major European war for a full century. It was also noteworthy that two smaller but important European nations, Switzerland and Sweden, emerged from this period devoted to principles of neutrality in any future conflict.

Peace Movements. New thinking, but also the fact of 25 years of recurrent war around the French revolution and Napoleon, sparked an unprecedented array of formal peace movements after 1815. Many liberals and socialists incorporated ideas of peace into their political movements. A number of industrialists picked up the argument that economic growth should replace war as the main goal of individuals and states. Several Russian spokespeople, ultimately including the novelist Tolstoy, stood for principled pacifism. A variety of peace leagues and publications emerged throughout Europe but also in the new United States. Obviously, this new flurry did not fundamentally recast actual government policies. It generated virtually no restraint in the emerging expansion of imperialism. But the existence of formal peace platforms was a change in itself, that would have clearer repercussions later on.

The Americas. War obviously occurred in the Americas even after the wars of independence created new sovereign states. The United States battled Mexico in its westward push, and there were two regional wars in Latin America itself. On the whole, however, the Americas became relatively peaceful, and this was not entirely accidental. Countries like Britain and France, eager to trade, and then the United States also developed interests in reducing conflict in the new world. The United States and Canada, after a brief period of uncertainty, developed a long and remarkable peaceful border. Most Latin American states supported only small armies, which might interfere in internal politics but did not display great appetite for external aggression. Shortly after 1900 a new organization even arose to encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in central America, encouraged by the United States and Mexico.

Outside the West. Most formal peace activity emanated from the West, but also Russia. The advocates did not necessarily have much knowledge of the wider world. But new ideas, along with the obvious threat of imperialism, did generate some interesting innovation elsewhere. The Bahai religious movement launched in Persia, for example, advocated a new union of all nations, along with universal disarmament. Several Chinese thinkers, reacting to Western military interference, sought to modify Confucianism to include clearer support for peace.

Initiatives in the Final Decades of the Period. Peace movements within Europe gained a new lease on life after the unification wars of Italy and Germany. In 1889 British and French advocates set up a new Interparliamentary Union, sponsoring various meetings that discussed alternative methods of resolving disputes. The Union even sought to revise history textbooks, to reduce flagrant nationalism. The Union helped organize a wider peace conference in 1899, with substantial support from the Russian tsar, that issued several high-sounding statements of principle and discussed mutual arms reduction. It had one concrete and durable result, the formation of a new Permanent Court of International Arbitration, in the Hague, that actually intervened successfully in several disputes before 1914, and that continues activity to this day. Finally, this was the period in which the new Olympic games sought an athletic alternative to conventional rivalries. In 1901 the Swedish entrepreneur Alfred Nobel set up the

Peace Prize, and the American industrialist Andrew Carnegie set up a new peace endowment. New thinking was beginning to have institutional results.

Impact. Of course the new thinking and new structures did not gain ascendancy overall. They did not prevent major war. They did not take adequate account of what was going on in the nonwestern world as a result of aggressive imperialism. It would be easy to write off this chapter in the period as a whole. But the innovations were real, and if not yet very effective they did generate new institutions that would set precedents for fuller activities later on. They form a legitimate complexity, as against the clearer innovations in the military sphere, in this world history period.

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Peace in World History. By Peter N. Stearns (Routledge, 2014).

Discussion

What was the role of the Enlightenment in promoting new ideas about peace?

What were the most successful aspects of the Vienna settlement?

What were the most important limitations of peace ideas and movements during the 19th century?

Discuss the causes and significance of the first Geneva Conventions.

Why did many Western observers around 1900 believe that peace was gaining ground?

Why was peace important to economic development? How did theories on capitalism and individual rights impact the development of peace ideology?

In what way did international peace movements begin to shift activist activities in the late 19th century to more direct action?

How did peace conferences mitigate violence in Europe? What influenced this international peace movement?

Chapter 29: Globalization

Context. Changes in trade and technology greatly intensified contacts among the world's regions. Despite tariff barriers, international trade grew massively, reaching unprecedented levels; this included of course the exchanges between industrial countries and raw materials producers. Key technology included the advent of effective steamships and transcontinental railroads, while communication accelerated with the invention of the telegraph and the laying of undersea cables. Construction of the Suez Canal great reduced travel time between Europe and Asia. New levels of migration, in an age before systematic passport controls, reflected new contact possibilities while contributing to them in turn. All of this coalesced particularly in the decades after 1850, introducing the world's first phase of genuine globalization.

Regions. Western nations took the lead in globalization, with their military and economic outreach. Key institutions of globalization were largely shaped by Western leadership. As a result, this phase of globalization and imperialism were closely intertwined, a key complication for the future. Export of Western cultural forms, and the expansion of Western high culture to embrace the Americas and Russia, formed part of this process. But the late 19th century was also a key period for globalization in other regions. Japan, most obviously, conducted a virtual about-face in its international posture, embracing global contacts with a vengeance, while adapting them to the regional culture. Many Latin American countries also responded quickly to global initiatives.

Institutions. The emergence of new international agreements was a crucial new step in the globalization process. In 1863 the United States called for a new initiative to facilitate mailing letters across borders; prior to this point, letters had to be entrusted to travelers, for there was no postal option. The German government responded to the problem, organizing a General Postal Union in 1874, through which nations agreed to accept each others' stamps at an agreed rate, permitting easy mailing connections for the first time. The principle of international collaboration spread widely. In the 1880s for example a convention on industrial property was signed, providing international acknowledgement of patents on inventions; the number of signatories, initially confined to Europe and parts of Latin America, would expand steadily. A number of other agreements applied to maritime issues, and of course arrangements such as the Geneva convention and the revived Olympic Games reflected and extended the pattern of cross-border collaborations.

Other Extensions. International gatherings of scientists reflected the new interest in moving beyond national confines. Collaboration in meteorology was particularly significant, in providing new access to weather data. But meetings to discuss control of epidemic diseases or statistical standards were also important. Another set of agreements divided the world into time zones (with Britain, predictably, at the center), to facilitate calculations in this area. Marxists helped set up a first and then second workers' International, based on the premise that the coming revolution would erase artificial boundaries for the sake of proletarian unity. Feminist organizations, more tentatively, sought to cut across borders, working to recruit delegates from places like China and Persia; one talked of reaching all women regardless of "races, nations, creeds and classes," while another, a bit more vaguely, referred to people "of the whole civilized world." A new World Purity Organization formed in 1900, to seek controls over sex trafficking, in what was then referred to as "white slavery"; and a number of countries, including several in Latin America, responded with new legislation. Humanitarianism began to internationalize as well. The American Rockefeller family sponsored medical research on key diseases in Africa and Latin America, while also setting up a new medical college in China; Andrew Carnegie widely sponsored library development.

Impacts. The expansion of globalization to various kinds of institutional arrangements and collaborations was a key development. The limitation of disproportionate Western leadership was not overcome, and more broadly the concomitant expansion of nationalism obviously constrained the whole trajectory. Clearly, global arrangements did not counter the growing impact of imperialism and military and economic rivalry. Yet the changes were significant, both at the time and in terms of precedent for the future. The idea of explicit mechanisms with worldwide application facilitated all sorts of transactions by 1900, and the potential for further development was obvious. Already in the first decade of the 20th century a new international labor organization began discussing agreements to restrict child labor and other forms of exploitation, the precursor of the International Labor Office that would form after World War I.

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A History of Globalization. By Peter N. Stearns, with John R. Garnett. From *Humanities Institute*. (December, 2013).

Discussion

What regions were most affected by globalization during the long 19th century? Discuss the relationship between globalization and economic policies before 1914. What were the main regional variations?

How did technological change accelerate globalization?

What role did commodities have in shaping globalization? How did these commodities affect exporting and importing nations?

How did Asian nations try to collectively respond to the pressures of globalization? What tensions between the nations constrained any significant action?

What were the main political and institutional changes associated with 19th century globalization?

Was globalization “Western” in the 19th century? How did the non-West reject or accept different forms of globalization?

Chapter 30: World War I and the End of the Period

A number of developments combined to bring the first industrial age to a close. By the early 20th century, for example, it was beginning to become clear that the Western monopoly over industrialization would not last, as Japan and Russia began to enter the ranks.

Other characteristic 19th-century arrangements began to come undone. The Victorian approach to gender, for example, stressing women's superior morality and domestic skills but also their inferiority in the public sphere, no longer satisfied feminist leaders; nor did it keep pace with the educational gains women were making, or their entry into the white-collar job market. Growing acceptance of new methods of birth control would also gradually displace Victorian emphasis on sexual restraint.

Revolutions in China and Mexico and growing unrest in Russia created new opportunities and instabilities in key parts of the world by the first decades of the 20th century. These developments revived and extended debates about monarchy and aristocracy, that had been raised but not resolved by the earlier Atlantic revolutions.

Public health measures, on yet another front, created a framework for a much more substantial round of global population growth. But Western population was stabilizing, generating a new disparity in overall trends.

In sum: it is easy to see in retrospect that major changes were brewing in many aspects of society, and in many parts of the world, that would ultimately help shape a rather different historical period. Many historians warn against focusing too simplistically on World War I itself as the crucial divide.

Nevertheless, it was on the military and diplomatic fronts that the long 19th century most clearly came unglued. World War I would contradict all the optimism about peace and progress that had greeted the advent of a new century in 1900. It would badly weaken Western Europe, economically, demographically, and culturally, yet it had been European superiority that had shaped many aspects of the preceding 150 years. The War would encourage anti-colonial nationalisms, a 19th-century product that had not yet however fully blossomed. It would dismantle most of the remaining multi-national land-based empires. These are at least some of the reasons the War proved crucial in opening a new period in world history.

So: why did it happen? Historians continue to debate, though some older arguments – for example, about some special German guilt – have been set aside as largely irrelevant. Here are key factors:

1. Imperialism had run out of options, but the movement had encouraged and reflected aggressive nationalist rivalries that would not easily end. Imperialism had supported Western industrial capitalism, providing outlets for profitable investment and assuring sources of supply for some key materials. It had resulted from new European military power, but it had also seemed essential in sustaining that power: for example, while steamships helped carry troops and weapons around the world, they also required control over coaling stations – another reason for new colonies. Most important, however, imperialism had provided outlets for nationalist rivalries. Germany, Japan and the United States sought imperial gains to reflect their growing power. Britain and France, longstanding rivals themselves, resisted, seeking new gains to show their own strength but also to protect established holdings. All of this proceeded rather smoothly for a short time: the major European contenders, for example, had agreed fairly smoothly on the division of Africa in a Berlin congress in the 1880s. But by 1914 there was no territory left to gobble up; French acquisition of Morocco was the last key move available. So rivalries turned back to Europe itself.
2. The power of a unified, industrial Germany had not been assimilated. For two decades after German unification was completed in 1871, the new nation itself helped preserve the peace. Its leaders created alliances – for example, simultaneously with Austria-Hungary and Russia – that were designed to protect established borders. However, this left France isolated and nervous (though imperialist gains distracted for a time), and did not fully engage Britain as the reigning world power. Then, a new German emperor, coming to the throne in 1891, led a more aggressive stance, moving Germany forward in the imperialist and naval sphere, creating growing concern in Britain. Economic rivalry, as Germany began to surpass Britain and several countries established new protective tariffs, added in. This situation led not only to the naval arms race, but to a reshuffling of alliances. France, Britain and Russia ultimately joined hands, against historical precedent but reflecting the growing anxiety about the German role. Germany, on the defensive in this framework, clung even more fiercely to its links with Austria-Hungary.

3. Social instabilities factored in, in several ways. Concerns about stability at home affected most of the European rivals, leaving them open to an interest in diplomatic or even military distractions. The British government was beleaguered by socialists, feminists and Irish nationalists; a diplomatic crisis might create a welcome degree of unity. German leaders had some similar thoughts as they watched the growing power of the socialist party. But the real instability lay with Russia, pressed by liberal and socialist demands and minority nationalist movements, and Austria-Hungary, where Slavic nationalisms were the main challenge. Fearing for survival, Austro-Hungarian leaders felt they could not compromise once a Serbian nationalist killed a member of the imperial family in 1914. Russia, a Slavic ally for Serbia, needed to make its own show of strength, hoping for a diplomatic success of its own. With these two powers refusing to back down, their respective allies – Germany, France and a more reluctant Britain – decided that they had to defend their weaker partners. So last minute efforts to resolve what could have been a minor crisis, including direct German-British negotiations, proved half-hearted, and war began. German-British balance thus combined with the instabilities of the two multi-national empires to produce stalemate.
4. Was this a larger crisis of industrial capitalism? Certainly big business, along with many aristocracies, supported some of the move that led to war, such as the profitable construction of larger navies and more artillery. Competition for sales had helped to generate the final round of imperialism, and new tariff policies that separated rather than joined the major players in the European economy. Industrialization had also generated new kinds of social tension that played their own role in decision making.
5. Miscalculation was a final component. Almost no one anticipated the kind of war that would result from the failures of diplomacy. Lessons from the United States Civil War, with its high casualty level and unexpected duration, had been largely ignored in Europe. Most people expected a brief, possibly exciting clash, and quick national success. Faith in progress may have encouraged this misconception, because it was hard to imagine the result of new military realities. But even as the struggle quickly became a brutal stalemate, no leader was able to step forward to seek compromise. Ultimately, a combination of popular nationalist excitement, easily stirred up against the new enemies, and the military habits of imperialism had created a new inability to reach across rivalries. And these new factors would show up as well, four years later, in a peace settlement that proved far less thoughtful than that of Vienna a hundred years before; the results of this failure would further shape the new world history period that emerged from such a difficult birth.

Complexity

Not surprisingly, even as the long 19th century drew to a close substantively as well as chronologically, many of the themes it had generated survived the transition. Industrialization was well established; cities and populations continued to grow; the special role of the West, though now open to serious modification, did not quickly end. Continuities from the long 19th century, in various spheres and many parts of the world, remain essential in assessing the world history that has emerged since 1914.

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Questions

What are the most important current debates over the causes of World War I?

Did the origins of the war lie mainly within Europe, or did it result more from advanced imperialism?

How did economic globalization contribute to World War I? What impact did the global have on domestic policies and tensions that led to war? Why did global economic links not do more to prevent the war?

Could and should the war have been prevented?

What political weaknesses and rivalries contributed to the outbreak of World War I? Did interdependence cause the war?

What was Russia's role in World War I? What impact did it have on Russian development? Is World War I a good boundary for periodization of Russian history?

How did early 20th century changes lead to America's involvement in World War I? What prevented earlier involvement?

Did the advent of the war signal a major break from the defining themes of the long 19th century? What other developments contributed to a break?

Final Questions for Course

What major changes in the 19th century distinguish it from prior periods? What continuities were there?

What were the main ways that industrialization, though centered in the West before 1900, affected Asia, Africa and Latin America.

What aspects of Western society and culture were particularly unpopular in many other parts of the world in the long 19th century? Where non-Western areas accepted Western cultural forms, how did they change them to fit their particular region/culture?

In what ways and for what reasons did nationalism develop more easily in Asia than in Africa during the 19th century?

While there is no question that new ideas about human rights developed in the long 19th century, were human rights ideas a major *factor* in world history during the period?

What changes in the state were most important in the long 19th century? How did these changes differ by region?

Were there coherent sub periods in world history during the long 19th century, and if so how should they be defined?

What are the main legacies of the long 19th century for world history in the contemporary era?